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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 One night in September 1973, a man known to us only as “Kenny” 
stood in charge of Bon’s Laundry #1 in Pinellas County, Florida.1 Mi-
chael Hancock and a few companions showed up and began banging 
on the doors to the laundromat, threatening to break in and take 
money.2 Kenny chased the young men and threw sulphuric acid on 
Hancock during the pursuit.3 Roughly one month later, Hancock 
filed suit against Willie and Anne Thomas as owners of Bon’s 
                                                                                                                    
 * J.D., with Highest Honors, Florida State University College of Law, 2002. I was 
first exposed to the issues explored in this Article while clerking with attorney Rip Caleen, 
to whom I am indebted for his patient and intelligent guidance. Thanks also go to attorney 
Hal Lewis for his comments on the draft, and to attorney Barbara Green of Coral Gables 
who took precious time to discuss the Article. Her insights were encouraging and exceed-
ingly helpful. Finally, my greatest thanks and love to Jennifer, Anne Marie, and Kate, who 
sacrificed the better part of a summer as Charley Patton played and I toiled away in my 
“cocoon.” 
 1. Thomas v. W. World Ins. Co., 343 So. 2d 1298, 1300 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
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Laundry #1.4 The Thomases’ premises liability insurer, Western 
World Insurance Company, reacted in a manner that is not alto-
gether uncommon, but which has raised novel issues of Florida law 
that have yet to be systematically addressed: Western World refused 
to defend the Thomases against Michael Hancock’s suit.5 
 Specifically, Willie Thomas reported Hancock’s suit to Western 
World’s local agent just three days after service of process.6 The 
agent furnished a written report to Western World together with a 
copy of Michael Hancock’s complaint which, significantly, sounded in 
negligence against the Thomases.7 Western World refused to investi-
gate the claim and refused its obligation to defend them because, as 
stated by Western World’s vice president of claims, the policy ex-
cluded coverage for “claims arising out of assault and battery.”8 This 
refusal was communicated to the Thomases the day before, or per-
haps on the very day, that they were required to formally answer Mi-
chael Hancock’s complaint.9 Though the premises liability policy af-
forded only $5,000 in coverage, Willie and Anne Thomas predictably 
defaulted and Michael Hancock obtained a final judgment against 
them for a total of $18,459.73.10 In the Thomases’ subsequent action 
against Western World,11 the insurer conceded its wrongful refusal to 
defend given that Hancock’s suit sounded in negligence which was 
covered under the policy.12 
 The appellate decision in Thomas probed the potential for bad 
faith recovery where an insurer’s blatantly wrongful refusal to de-
fend resulted in an excess judgment against its insureds.13 The court 
concluded in essence that bad faith requires a breach of fiduciary 
                                                                                                                    
 4. Id. 
 5. Id.  
 6. Id.  
 7. Id. 
 8. Id.  
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. The Thomases’ action against Western World is discussed further in Part III.B., 
infra. 
 12. Thomas, 343 So. 2d at 1300-01. Not only was Hancock’s negligence action a cov-
ered occurrence under the policy, but Kenny’s act of dousing acid on Hancock almost cer-
tainly fell beyond the scope of Kenny’s employment. In the words of the Second District 
Court of Appeal: “This defense may well have been sufficient to relieve the insureds from 
liability that might otherwise have been imposed under the doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior.” Id. at 1302-03. In other words, Hancock’s case would most likely have been dismissed 
or disposed of on summary judgment had Western World defended against the claim. 
 13. See id. An “excess judgment” occurs when a third party brings a legal action that 
results in a judgment exceeding the liability policy limits applicable to the occurrence giv-
ing rise to that action. The insured defendant is personally liable for any amount exceeding 
liability insurance coverage and might bring (or assign to the judgment creditor) a bad 
faith action against the insurer claiming that had the insurer acted properly, the excess 
judgment would not have occurred. The damages available in bad faith include the amount 
of the excess judgment, among others. Damages are touched upon in Part III.F., infra. 
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duty but that the fiduciary duty arises only in connection with the 
actual defense and settlement of a third-party claim. It follows, said 
the court, that where there is a refusal to defend, there can be no 
breach of fiduciary duty and, hence, no bad faith; in actuality, West-
ern World “exercised no faith at all.”14 
 I hope to demonstrate the inadequacy of this analysis while sug-
gesting reasons why and methods by which liability insurers may be 
held liable for bad faith refusal to defend. This is no small task be-
cause the Thomas court was largely correct in claiming that bad faith 
arises only where a fiduciary duty exists and that this duty has tra-
ditionally arisen upon assumption of the insured’s defense.15 There 
also remains a question whether bad faith might afford remedies not 
available under the broad recovery of foreseeable breach of contract 
damages recognized in Thomas.16 In short, my analysis calls for a re-
assessment of Florida’s entire approach to bad faith, albeit with the 
limited purpose of recognizing the true nature of refusal to defend as 
a potential bad faith claim. I am encouraged by a sincere belief that 
the pieces of Florida’s refusal-to-defend puzzle have never been put 
together at one sitting and, indeed, that a few remain in the box. My 
hope is that a patient hand may reveal the need and the means for 
addressing this oversight in Florida’s bad faith jurisprudence. 
 In substance, I contend that a liability insurer’s obligation of good 
faith is not limited to a fiduciary duty that attaches upon the as-
sumption of an insured’s defense. Indeed, to view the contractual re-
lationship in this manner might give the insurer an incentive to 
avoid potential bad faith by breaching its contractual duty to defend. 
Rather, I contend that the insurer is bound contractually by the im-
plied covenant of good faith (“Covenant”), the breach of which may 
give rise to bad faith liability although the insurer never formally as-
sumed any defense of the insured.17 The Covenant carries obligations 
that attach prior to the assumption of an insured’s defense and it 
demands of an insurer a fidelity that may not be lightly disregarded. 
                                                                                                                    
 14. Thomas, 343 So. 2d at 1303-04. The Thomas court nevertheless held the insurer 
liable for the excess judgment under a theory of foreseeable contract damages. See id. 
While this is an acceptable resolution for a contract claim, refusal to defend may prove 
more than a mere breach of contract and may well warrant the imposition of punitive and 
noneconomic damages as discussed in Part III.F., infra. 
 15. The evolution of this doctrine and of Florida bad faith jurisprudence generally is 
discussed in Part II.A., infra. 
 16. See Thomas, 343 So. 2d at 1304. This Article focuses on placing refusal to defend 
in its proper bad faith context regardless of whether it might result in damages different 
from or additional to those available in a strict contract action. Nevertheless, I briefly dis-
cuss damages because they are integral to the subject. 
 17. Given the cumbersomeness of repeating the phrase “implied covenant of good 
faith,” I refer to it throughout the Article as the “Covenant.” This encompasses the phrase 
in its numerous permutations such as the implied covenant of fair dealing and commercial 
reasonableness, the implied duty of fair dealing, etc. 
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Its breach is tortious; and an egregious breach of the Covenant (a 
“bad faith” breach rather than a “mere” breach), should give rise to 
potential tort damages encompassing nonecomonic losses and puni-
tive measures. Thus, because the Covenant precedes and informs an 
insurer’s decision whether to assume defense of its insured, a refusal 
to defend may breach the Covenant if not carried out in good faith. 
 To arrive at these substantive conclusions, I must take a specific 
course. I first address in Part II the evolution of bad faith and the 
Covenant in Florida, as well as the nature or spirit of these causes of 
action. The next logical step is to locate where refusal to defend falls 
within this jurisprudential framework. Therefore, in Part III, I at-
tempt to answer the core question of whether refusal to defend 
should be considered “bad faith” in tort or “no faith” in contract. I ar-
gue that while the notion of “no faith” comports with bad faith law as 
it has developed in Florida, this is neither a necessary nor desirable 
approach. The discussion accordingly treats refusal to defend as bad 
faith and attempts to clearly delineate the elements of the potential 
bad faith refusal-to-defend cause of action. I also consider in Part III 
the remedies that might lie for bad faith refusal to defend in light of 
general remedies available in the modern bad faith context. Finally, I 
conclude by digesting these observations into what I hope will prove 
a coherent and workable framework for bad faith refusal to defend. 
II.   THE EVOLUTION AND NATURE OF BAD FAITH 
A.   Evolution and Myopia in Florida Bad Faith Law 
 Bad faith was born in Florida on November 9, 1938, with the 
rendering of the Florida Supreme Court’s opinion in Auto Mutual In-
demnity Co. v. Shaw.18 The case involved the now familiar excess 
judgment scenario in which the injured plaintiff made a demand 
upon the insurer that was not accepted by the insurer and thereupon 
obtained a judgment against the insured exceeding the available pol-
icy limits.19 Departing from traditional contract principles, the court 
in Shaw embraced the concept of bad faith by seizing upon the fact 
that the insurer had issued a liability policy rather than an indem-
nity policy—the distinction being that the liability policy included a 
defense clause that precluded the insured from “negotiating for a set-
tlement, or interfering in any manner except upon the request of the 
insurer.”20  
                                                                                                                    
 18. 184 So. 852 (Fla. 1938). 
 19. See id. at 853-54. 
 20. Id. at 857. In fact, a driving force behind the common law move to bad faith in-
cluded a general trend away from indemnity agreements in favor of liability policies given 
the insurer abuses that accompanied indemnity agreements. See generally Roger C. Hen-
derson, The Tort of Bad Faith in First-Party Insurance Transactions: Refining the Stan-
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 Under a traditional indemnity agreement, the insured would con-
duct a defense and seek indemnification from the insurer for monies 
expended in defending the claim and satisfying any ultimate judg-
ment.21 The liability policy, however, required that the insured re-
frain from any negotiation or legal maneuvering with respect to the 
claim so that the insurer maintained total control over defense and 
settlement.22 The court in Shaw followed the lead of a seminal Wis-
consin bad faith decision23 and ruled that where the insurer assumed 
total control over the defense and settlement of claims, it “should be 
held to that degree of care and diligence which a man of ordinary 
care and prudence should exercise in the management of his own 
business.”24 The decision in Shaw noted, in words reminiscent of the 
modern Covenant, that the insurer bore a duty “not under the terms 
of the contract strictly speaking, but because of and flowing from it, 
to act honestly and in good faith toward the insured.”25 
 While Shaw thus suggested that an insurer’s duty of good faith 
arose by legal implication and therefore could pose broader obliga-
tions than those attendant in the assumption of the insured’s legal 
defense, the decision apparently considered assumption of the in-
sured’s defense a threshold to bad faith liability.26 Indeed, the court, 
in dicta, considered the refusal-to-defend “class” of cases and noted 
that an insurer’s liability would not exceed “the limit of indemnity 
which it agreed to furnish.”27 And so the Shaw decision, which hark-
ened to a covenant of good faith implied in law, instead spoke ulti-
mately in terms of duties arising where the insurer has assumed con-
trol of the claim at hand.28 
                                                                                                                    
dard of Culpability and Reformulating the Remedies by Statute, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
1, 16-18 (1992). With the rise of the defense clauses that characterize liability policies came 
the implied or fiduciary duties relied upon in Shaw and discussed throughout this Article. 
 21. See Henderson, supra note 20, at 16.  
 22. See id. at 16-17. 
 23. Hilker v. W. Auto. Ins. Co., 231 N.W. 257 (Wis. 1930), modified on reh’g, 235 N.W. 
413 (Wis. 1931). 
 24. Shaw, 184 So. at 859. 
 25. Id. (quoting Am. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 61 F.2d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 1932)). 
 26. The decision quotes Hilker in holding that the insurer’s duties arise “because it 
has taken over this duty [to defend and settle], and because the contract prohibits the in-
sured from settling.” Id. at 857 (quoting Hilker, 235 N.W. at 414-15). Though these are im-
plied duties, similar to the ever-present Covenant, there is little question that as conceived 
by these early decisions, the duties arose only where the insurer assumed control of the 
claim. 
 27. Id. (quoting Wis. Zinc Co. v. Fid. & Deposit Co., 155 N.W. 1081 (Wis. 1916)). The 
court mentioned that breach of the duty to defend would release the insured to pursue a 
private defense and settle the case with a right of indemnification within policy limits. The 
court apparently did not consider that an insured might not be capable of hiring private 
counsel and might therefore suffer a default, an excess judgment, or both, due solely to the 
insurer’s failure to defend the claim. 
 28. See id. at 857-59.  
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 Viewing Shaw realistically, it seems the Florida Supreme Court, 
like many courts around the nation at the time,29 recognized the po-
tential for abuse where insurers maintained total control over de-
fense and settlement on behalf of a given insured whose interests 
might often prove adverse to those of the insurer. The court tweaked 
the common law to remedy this situation. In so doing, it naturally 
changed the law as little as possible and hinged its decision upon the 
nature of the liability policy. The court might easily have held that 
the duty of good faith arose at the time of contracting and encom-
passed the duty to defend. It was not faced with that question, how-
ever, and it instead framed its holding in a manner that would ulti-
mately isolate refusal-to-defend claims from its bad faith jurispru-
dence.30 
 The Shaw rationale led to a preoccupation with an insurer’s fail-
ure to settle as the primary basis for bad faith recovery. Courts since 
Shaw have focused on how a defense was handled and with what re-
sult to determine whether bad faith occurred.31 This has yielded a 
bad faith jurisprudence predicated upon an insurer’s so-called fiduci-
ary duties in third-party litigation with excess judgment viewed as 
the litmus for bad faith liability.32 In light of this approach, putative 
first-party and refusal-to-defend bad faith claims appear anomalous 
because they lack these tell-tale signs of “classic,” that is, third-party, 
bad faith.33 
                                                                                                                    
 29. See generally Henderson, supra note 20, at 17-22 (describing the larger jurispru-
dential landscape in which bad faith arose). 
 30. Incidentally, the fact that the court in Shaw was not faced with a refusal-to-
defend claim means that its holding would not necessarily apply in the refusal-to-defend 
context. See Canal Ins. Co. v. Sturgis, 114 So. 2d 469, 470 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959) (analyzing 
Shaw and stating: “It is axiomatic, of course, that every judicial decision must be read in 
the light of the particular factual situation that gave rise to that decision.”). 
 31. See, e.g., Kelly v. Williams, 411 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982).  
 32. Id. at 904 (“The essence of a ‘bad faith’ insurance suit . . . is that the insurer 
breached its duty to its insured by failing to properly or promptly defend the claim . . . all 
of which results in the insured being exposed to an excess judgment.”); see also State Farm 
Fire & Cas. Co. v. Zebrowski, 706 So. 2d 275, 277 (Fla. 1997) (“[I]n the absence of an excess 
judgment, a third-party plaintiff cannot demonstrate that the insurer breached a duty to-
ward its insured.”); Boston Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Gutierrez, 386 So. 2d 783, 785 (Fla. 1980) 
(“[W]hen the insured has surrendered to the insurer all control over the handling of the 
claim, including all decisions with regard to litigation and settlement, then the insurer 
must assume a duty to exercise such control and make such decisions in good faith . . . .”); 
Thompson v. Commercial Union Fire Ins. Co., 250 So. 2d 259, 260 (Fla. 1971) (“[A]n in-
sured has the right to sue and recover damages against his own insurer for an excess 
judgment on the basis of fraud or bad faith in the conduct of the insured’s defense by the 
insurer.”) (citing Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Davis, 146 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 1st DCA 1962)); Baxter 
v. Royal Indem. Co., 285 So. 2d 652, 656 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973) (“It is the existence of the fi-
duciary relationship between the parties under the bodily injury liability provisions of the 
policy which imposes upon the insurer the obligation of exercising good faith . . . .”).  
 33. See Baxter, 285 So. 2d at 655 (refusing to recognize first-party bad faith because 
there is no fiduciary relationship as in the third-party context); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co. v. Laforet, 658 So. 2d 55, 59 (Fla. 1995) (noting that first-party bad faith did not exist 
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 Florida’s bad faith jurisprudence need not have evolved in this 
manner. California courts, the vanguard in the march toward bad 
faith liability, decided as early as 1958 in the case of Comunale v. 
Traders and General Insurance Co.34 that an insurer who refused to 
defend and thereafter refused a settlement offer could be held in bad 
faith by having breached “an implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing” that exists in “every contract.”35 As it happened, the 
Comunale court reached this decision by relying in large part upon 
the very case that Shaw cited in recognizing Florida’s bad faith cause 
of action.36 Admittedly, the Comunale court held that, absent the 
subsequent settlement offer, the refusal to defend alone would afford 
only damages up to the policy limits with additional attorney’s fees 
and costs.37 But California has since recognized a cause of action for 
bad faith refusal to defend predicated upon breach of the Covenant.38 
Other jurisdictions have done likewise.39 This is not to say that Flor-
ida might blindly choose the route that California has taken. Instead 
it illustrates that Florida’s particular view of bad faith has blinded it 
to legally cognizable options that might have seemed more feasible 
had the law developed differently.  
 The Colorado appellate court in Wheeler v. Reese, for example, 
faced no conceptual impediment in assigning bad faith liability for an 
                                                                                                                    
at common law because “the type of fiduciary duty that exists in third-party actions is not 
present . . . and the insurer is not exposing the insured to excess liability”); Fid. & Cas. Co. 
v. Cope, 462 So. 2d 459, 461 (Fla. 1985) (refusing to recognize bad faith claim where in-
sured tortfeasor had been released and thus faced no further exposure); Thomas v. W. 
World Ins. Co., 343 So. 2d 1298, 1304 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) (holding that refusal to assume 
defense precludes finding of bad faith because insurer exercised “no faith”). It must be 
mentioned that a statutory cause of action has existed since 1982 for first-party bad faith 
pursuant to section 624.155, Florida Statutes. It is my opinion that the statute affords no 
relief for refusal to defend except, arguably and only then in exceptional circumstances, 
through the refusal-to-settle provisions of the statute. I am not aware of any statutory re-
fusal-to-defend claim in Florida. While the legislature might do well to revisit the statute 
in this regard, I focus here on common law remedies because my thesis is that Florida 
common law affords a remedy for refusal to defend even if that remedy has been long-
overlooked. 
 34. 328 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1958). 
 35. Id. at 200. 
 36. See id. at 200-01 (“[T]he rights of the insured ‘go deeper than the mere surface of 
the contract’ . . . and that implied obligations are imposed ‘based upon those principles of 
fair dealing which enter into every contract.’”) (quoting Hilker v. W. Auto. Ins. Co., 231 
N.W. 257, 258 (Wis. 1930), modified on reh’g, 235 N.W. 413 (Wis. 1931)). 
 37. See id. at 201. 
 38. See Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Prods. Sales & Mktg., Inc., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
364, 387 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); Amato v. Mercury Cas. Co., 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909, 912 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1997); Campbell v. Super. Ct., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 385, 392 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). 
 39. See Tibbs v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 755 F.2d 1370, 1375 (9th Cir. 1985) (predicting 
California law); Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Hawkins, 292 F. Supp. 947, 952 (S.D. Iowa 1968) (“It 
is the view of this Court that the Iowa Supreme Court will likewise apply the bad faith test 
to excess judgment cases where the insurer wrongfully refused to defend . . . .”) (predicting 
Iowa law); Wheeler v. Reese, 835 P.2d 572, 578 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992); Smith v. Am. Family 
Mut. Ins. Co., 294 N.W.2d 751 passim (N.D. 1980).  
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insurer’s refusal to defend because it was seen as just one more way 
that an insurer might breach its implied duty of good faith.40 The 
court avoided Florida’s problem of exactly how to approach bad faith 
where assumption of the insured’s defense is viewed as a threshold 
question rather than the actual matter at issue.41 Instead, tortious 
breaches of contract in Colorado generally are viewed as giving rise 
to bad faith liability regardless of whether they are first- or third-
party and regardless of the context in which they might arise.42 Yet 
Florida’s inability to so easily approach refusal-to-defend claims is 
self-imposed. Florida has embraced the Covenant in the insurance 
context,43 but it has failed to square that concept with its un-
derdeveloped refusal-to-defend jurisprudence. The purpose of this 
Article is to demonstrate that the intertwining of these two strands 
in Florida law is not only possible, but necessary. 
B.   Evolution of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith 
 Paralleling the rise of bad faith—indeed, integral to its ascen-
dancy—was the rise of the Covenant, which appeared in an embry-
onic form in Shaw itself. The Shaw decision did not speak in the 
modern parlance of a fiduciary duty owed by an insurer to its in-
sured. Rather, it referred to a larger “duty, not under the terms of 
the contract strictly speaking, but . . . flowing from it, to act honestly 
and in good faith toward the insured.”44 This “duty” (of good faith) 
was necessarily implied given that it did not arise from the contract 
“strictly speaking.”45 
 This is the essence of the Covenant in its modern form and it 
could be argued, therefore, that the Covenant was present at the 
birth of Florida bad faith although, as noted above, the Shaw court 
clearly felt that the duty arose because the insurer maintained con-
trol over the defense and settlement of the insured’s claim.46 The 
                                                                                                                    
 40. See 835 P.2d at 578.  
 41. See id.; see also Best Place, Inc. v. Penn Am. Ins. Co., 920 P.2d 334, 341-44 (Haw. 
1996) (recognizing a cause of action for first-party bad faith predicated on breach of the 
Covenant). 
 42. The standard of culpability differs between first- and third-party claims, but 
assumption of the defense is not seen as a “trigger” to an insurer’s duty of good faith as it 
has grown to be seen in Florida. 
 43. See infra Part II.B. 
 44. Auto Mut. Indem. Co. v. Shaw, 184 So. 852, 859 (Fla. 1938) (quoting Am. Mut. 
Liab. Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 61 F.2d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 1932)). 
 45. See Sharp v. Williams, 192 So. 476, 480 (Fla. 1940) (“A contract includes not only 
the things written, but also terms and matters which, though not actually expressed, are 
implied by law, and these are as binding as the terms which are actually written or spo-
ken.”) (citing S.F. Bowser & Co. v. Marks, 131 S.W. 334 (Ark. 1910)); McGill v. Cockrell, 
101 So. 199, 201 (Fla. 1924) (“[W]hat the law implies, from the relation of parties created 
by an express agreement is as much a part of the contract as that which is expressed.”). 
 46. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.  
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Covenant as such was born twenty years later in California with the 
California Supreme Court’s Comunale decision.47 The Comunale 
court faced a refusal to defend where an offer of settlement was nev-
ertheless tendered to the liability carrier despite the refusal to de-
fend.48 It is clear that the insurer in Comunale never assumed de-
fense of the claim, which would have been required by Shaw and its 
progeny to trigger the insurer’s fiduciary obligations upon which 
Florida bad faith apparently hinges. Yet the California court took a 
larger view of the insurer/insured relationship and held: “There is an 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract that 
neither party will do anything which will injure the right of the other 
to receive the benefits of the agreement. This principle is applicable 
to policies of insurance.”49 From its inception in Comunale, the 
breach was considered tortious.50 This notion was reaffirmed in Gru-
enberg v. Aetna Insurance Co.51 where the California Supreme Court 
made clear that bad faith liability was not predicated on a breach of 
contract but arose instead from “a duty included within the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”52 The Gruenberg court inter-
preted Comunale to mean that breach of the Covenant sounded both 
in contract and in tort,53 though it concluded that failure to settle 
“may give rise to a cause of action in tort for breach of an implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”54 This applied without reser-
vation to the first-party fire insurance claims at issue in that case.55 
 Less than six months after the Gruenberg decision, Florida’s First 
District Court of Appeal handed down its decision in Baxter v. Royal 
Indemnity Co.56 Ironically, the majority opinion in Baxter refused to 
recognize a cause of action for first-party bad faith in Florida because 
the first-party insurer/insured relationship lacked the “fiduciary” na-
ture of the typical third-party bad faith claim.57 The Baxter opinion 
deemed the first-party relationship “the very antithesis of that estab-
                                                                                                                    
 47. Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1958). 
 48. See id. at 200. 
 49. Id. (citations omitted). 
 50. See id. at 203. The court held that the breach was to be “treated as a tort,” though 
it deemed it an exception to the tort limitations period and opted for the lengthier limita-
tions period afforded contract actions. 
 51. 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973). 
 52. Id. at 1037 (quoting Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 177 (Cal. 1967)). 
 53. See id. at 1036. 
 54. Id. at 1037. 
 55. See id. at 1034 (discussing coverages at issue in the case). 
 56. 285 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973). 
 57. See id. at 656 (“Because of the fiduciary relationship arising under the bodily in-
jury liability provision of an automobile policy, insurers have been held liable for any 
judgment rendered against their insured in excess of the policy limits . . . .”) (citing Am. 
Fire & Cas. Co. v. Davis, 146 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 1st DCA 1962), and Auto Mut. Indem. Co. v. 
Shaw, 184 So. 852 (Fla. 1938)). 
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lished by the bodily injury liability provisions of the same policy.”58 
While its logic that the first-party insured would not be harmed by 
an excess judgment was sound, its premise reveals the earmarks that 
Florida courts were looking for at the time: a purportedly 
nonadversarial relationship with exposure to an excess judgment. 
The court concluded that “[i]t is the existence of the fiduciary rela-
tionship between the parties under the bodily injury liability provi-
sions of the policy which imposes upon the insurer the obligation of 
exercising good faith.”59 
 Despite this prevailing view, Judge Spector’s dissent in Baxter 
embraced a broad concept of bad faith premised upon the Covenant.60 
He cited the Florida Supreme Court decision in Nationwide Mutual 
Insurance Co. v. McNulty61 for the proposition that the duty to exer-
cise good faith “though not expressed flows from the contract.”62 Ul-
timately, Judge Spector was quite explicit with reference to Califor-
nia cases in holding that the Covenant is implied by law, that it ex-
ists in every contract, that it comports with Florida’s prior judicial 
decisions, and that it would permit a common law first-party bad 
faith claim.63 
 The Baxter decision did not directly address breach of the Cove-
nant as a cause of action in bad faith, though its narrow view of an 
insurer’s duty left little doubt how it might decide the question. It is 
precisely because of this view that the Covenant, which thrives in 
Florida, has yet to be incorporated formally into Florida bad faith ju-
risprudence. There is no reason it should not, particularly in the re-
fusal-to-defend context.64 
                                                                                                                    
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. This epitomizes the myopic view of bad faith that resulted from the Shaw deci-
sion. 
 60. See id. at 658.  
 61. 229 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1969). 
 62. Baxter, 285 So. 2d at 659 (Spector, J., dissenting). 
 63. See id. at 661-62 (Spector, J., dissenting). Though I agree with Judge Spector’s 
analysis and I believe my analysis of the Covenant in this Article would permit common 
law first-party bad faith claims, it should be remembered that the ultimate point of this 
Article concerns refusal to defend which, as shall be demonstrated, is third-party in na-
ture. As such, Baxter would have no impact upon my analysis. Of course, Baxter was abro-
gated by statute with the passage of section 624.155, Florida Statutes, which permits first-
party bad faith claims. 
 64. A number of bad faith decisions discuss the Covenant to some extent or another as 
noted throughout this Article, but none has considered the point at which the Covenant at-
taches vis-à-vis the general premise that a bad faith breach of fiduciary duties cannot oc-
cur until assumption of an insured’s defense. One case held as much in effect, but without 
an express analysis of this issue. See Am. Fid. Fire Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 177 So. 2d 679, 683 
(Fla. 1st DCA 1965) (holding a refusal to defend as “tantamount to bad faith in the per-
formance of its contractual obligations to the insured” but without direct reference to the 
Covenant) (emphasis added). Also interesting are the discovery cases holding that an in-
surer’s “fiduciary” duties relate back to the filing of the claim once a declaratory judgment 
of coverage has been entered. See Gen. Accident Fire & Life Ins. Corp. v. Boudreau, 658 So. 
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 A brief overview of the doctrine is necessary to prove this eventual 
claim before delving into the specific interplay between the Covenant 
and refusal to defend. Judge Van Nortwick of the First District Court 
of Appeal offered a concise and thoroughly cited discussion of the 
doctrine in Cox v. CSX Intermodal Inc.: 
It is axiomatic that “[e]very contract includes not only its written 
provisions, but also the terms and matters which, though not ac-
tually expressed, are implied by law, and these are as binding as 
the terms which are actually written or spoken.” One of the im-
plied contract terms recognized . . . in Florida law . . . is the im-
plied covenant of good faith, fair dealing, and commercial reason-
ableness. This implied covenant arises because “[a] contract is an 
agreement whereby each party promises to perform their part of 
the bargain in good faith, and expects the other party to do the 
same.”65 
The doctrine is necessarily vague given its ethereal quality and the 
broad range of circumstances to which it must apply. Yet it is not dif-
ficult to imagine conduct that might amount to a breach. The Re-
statement has characterized it this way: 
Subterfuges and evasions violate the obligation of good faith in 
performance even though the actor believes his conduct to be justi-
fied. But the obligation goes further: bad faith may be overt or may 
consist of inaction, and fair dealing may require more than hon-
esty. A complete catalogue of types of bad faith is impossible, but 
the following types are among those which have been recognized in 
judicial decisions: evasion of the spirit of the bargain, lack of dili-
gence and slacking off, willful rendering of imperfect performance, 
abuse of a power to specify terms, and interference with or failure 
to cooperate in the other party’s performance.66 
 In Florida, there are three restrictions on causes of action for 
breach of the Covenant. The first two merit mention as an academic 
matter; the third requires more discussion. The first and second re-
strictions are interrelated: the Covenant may never override the ex-
press terms of a contract, and the Covenant is never breached absent 
the breach of an express policy provision.67 These are sensible limita-
tions given that the Covenant is in essence a code of conduct that 
governs the performance of express contractual terms. It neither re-
places those terms nor attaches in their absence. These considera-
                                                                                                                    
2d 1006, 1007 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (holding that the insurer’s “fiduciary” duties relate back 
to “the time [the insurer] received notice of the claim.”); Fortune Ins. Co. v. Greene, 775 So. 
2d 338, 339 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (same). 
 65. 732 So. 2d 1092, 1097 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (citations omitted) (quoting First Na-
tionwide Bank v. Fla. Software Servs., Inc., 770 F. Supp. 1537, 1542-43 (M.D. Fla. 1991)). 
 66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. d (1979). 
 67. See Ins. Concepts & Design, Inc. v. Healthplan Servs., Inc., 785 So. 2d 1232, 1234-
35 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). 
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tions would arise rarely, if ever, in the typical liability insurance sce-
nario because the duty to defend is a common and generally unquali-
fied duty in every liability policy.68 In short, every refusal-to-defend 
insurance action rests a fortiori upon the alleged breach by an in-
surer of an express contractual duty to defend. 
 The third restriction establishes that the Covenant applies only 
where a contracting party is exercising some measure of discretion in 
carrying out a contractual duty (since a nondiscretionary act can not 
by definition be undertaken in bad faith).69 The duty to defend aris-
ing from liability insurance contracts is self-evidently discretionary 
in every instance: an insurer must review the allegations brought 
against its insured and make a determination both of coverage and of 
its duty to defend. It has a range of options in deciding how to pro-
ceed.70 Hence, the Covenant applies to an insurer’s decision whether 
to defend its insured against a third-party liability claim and it 
“raises an implied obligation of good faith to observe reasonable lim-
its in exercising that discretion, consistent with the parties’ purpose 
or purposes in contracting.”71 
 Yet some anticipatory response must be made to the beguiling 
counterargument that an insurer never has the discretion to breach 
its duty to defend. An insurer might argue that defense provisions 
are not subject to the Covenant because the duty to defend is deter-
mined by an objective comparison of the underlying complaint with 
the policy provisions; that is, it is a nondiscretionary decision. But is 
there ever discretion to breach a contract? Every discretionary deci-
sion deemed a breach of the Covenant is ultimately found by a court 
to be a decision the party did not have the discretion to make (or to 
make in the manner it was made). Every discretionary power con-
ferred by a given contract is naturally limited by the law governing 
the parties’ relationship. In the liability insurance relationship, the 
insurer is charged with exercising unilateral judgment regarding in-
                                                                                                                    
 68. For a general discussion of the duty to defend, see infra Part III.A. 
 69. See Cox, 732 So. 2d at 1097-98 (“Thus, where the terms of the contract afford a 
party substantial discretion to promote that party’s self-interest, the duty to act in good 
faith nevertheless limits that party’s ability to act capriciously . . . .”); see also Cheek v. 
Agric. Ins. Co., 432 F.2d 1267, 1269 (5th Cir. 1970) (“The law of Florida imposes a duty 
upon the insurer to act honestly and in good faith toward the insured in the defense and 
settlement of claims . . . . The insurer will thus be liable for any damage caused by his fail-
ure to act in good faith.”) (citing Burton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 335 F.2d 317, 
324 n.14 (5th Cir. 1964); Tully v. Travelers Ins. Co., 118 F. Supp. 568, 569 (N.D. Fla. 
1954)); Auto Mut. Indem. Co. v. Shaw, 184 So. 852, 859 (Fla. 1938).  
 70. The contractual duty to defend is discussed generally infra Part III.A. 
 71. Cox, 732 So. 2d at 1097 (quoting Centronics v. Genicom Corp., 562 A.2d 187, 193 
(N.H. 1989) (Souter, J.)); see also Ins. Concepts & Design, Inc., 785 So. 2d at 1234 (“This 
covenant is intended to protect ‘the reasonable expectations of the contracting parties in 
light of their express agreement.’”) (quoting Barnes v. Burger King Corp., 932 F. Supp. 
1420, 1438 (S.D. Fla. 1996)). 
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dependent facts as alleged in the underlying complaint. To say that 
the decisionmaking process is not discretionary because it ultimately 
has only one correct legal outcome fails to distinguish this situation 
from any other that might arise under the Covenant. 
 As a practical matter, the insurer would likely argue before a trial 
judge that its decision not to defend does not breach the Covenant 
because the Covenant applies only to discretionary acts. Because the 
insurer has no discretion to breach its duty to defend, the argument 
goes, failure to defend the insured is not a discretionary act and 
therefore cannot breach the Covenant. This argument begs the ques-
tion because the insurer decides whether the claim is covered in the 
first instance. To the extent that its decision can be second-guessed 
in a court of law says nothing of insurance contracts that cannot be 
said of all contract decisions. The liability insurer is charged under 
the contract language with determining whether to defend, a deter-
mination that is inherently discretionary even if bounded (like all 
discretionary decisions) by the letter of the law. The insurer is there-
fore subject to the Covenant in deciding whether to defend. 
 Finally, there is the critical question of when the Covenant at-
taches. Because it imposes “terms and matters which, though not ac-
tually expressed, are implied by law” that are “as binding as the 
terms which are actually written or spoken,”72 it follows that the 
Covenant exists from the time of contracting, though it would not be 
triggered until one of the contracting parties undertakes perform-
ance of a discretionary duty, for example, considering whether to as-
sume the defense of a third-party claim.73 Stated differently, the 
Covenant “attaches only to the performance of a specific contractual 
obligation,”74 and therefore it arises, at the latest, when performance 
of that obligation is begun. Similar to any code of ethics, the Cove-
nant is ever-present in a normative sense, yet it is never brought to 
bear unless breached. In this sense, it “attaches” to the performance 
of a given obligation, but to attach it must necessarily preexist the 
performance. Alternatively, it might be thought of as nonexistent un-
til a performance is undertaken whereupon it arises in tandem with 
the event giving rise to the performance, for example, a notice of 
claim. 
                                                                                                                    
 72. Cox, 732 So. 2d at 1097. 
 73. Most hold that the Covenant imposes broad duties arising from the very nature of 
the contract and the relationship it creates. See, e.g., Decker v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 
Inc., 931 P.2d 436, 443 (Colo. 1997) (“An insurer’s tort liability for breach of an implied 
duty of good faith and fair dealing arises from the nature of the insurance contract as well 
as from the relationship between the insurer and the insured.”).  
 74. Ins. Concepts & Design, Inc., 785 So. 2d at 1235 (quoting Johnson Enter. of Jack-
sonville, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc., 162 F.3d 1290, 1314 (11th Cir. 1998)). 
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 Under no circumstances, however, could the Covenant attach af-
ter the obligation of performance has arisen. This means, in the re-
fusal-to-defend context, that when an insurer receives notice of a 
claim, the Covenant governs every aspect of its consideration of that 
claim including its ultimate decision whether to assume a defense of 
the insured. And this is the axis where Florida bad faith law and 
Florida Covenant law meet—for Florida law since Shaw has charac-
terized bad faith as the breach of a fiduciary duty that arises upon 
assumption of the insured’s defense, yet it also recognizes a duty im-
plied by law to act in good faith before assumption of the insured’s 
defense.75 Unless these two lines of Florida jurisprudence are woven 
together, refusal to defend will remain stranded from bad faith de-
spite the absence of any compelling logic or policy demanding this re-
sult. 
 For reasons that will become evident, it is important to reiterate 
that the Covenant applies to every contract, that it is implied by law, 
and that it “cannot, by definition, be waived by either party to the 
agreement.”76 It applies without reservation to insurance contracts in 
Florida,77 and it attaches no later than the event giving rise to the in-
surer’s duty to carry out the obligation deemed breached. 
C.   Classic Bad Faith: Tort or Contract? 
 Now that the relevant contours of Florida bad faith and Covenant 
jurisprudence have been laid out, it is necessary to visit briefly upon 
the nature of these claims including whether they arise in tort or in 
contract. Due in large part to its myopic view of an insurer’s duties, 
Florida has developed a fractured if workable bad faith jurispru-
dence. Characteristic of Florida’s approach is its hesitance to 
squarely address the issue of whether bad faith arises in tort or in 
contract. Admittedly, the question is a difficult one that has been re-
solved by some with the compromise that bad faith represents a 
move toward “ConTort,” the fusion of contract with tort.78 In Miller v. 
                                                                                                                    
 75. For an interesting discussion of how the insurer/insured relationship differs from 
a true fiduciary one, see Love v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 271 Cal. Rptr. 246, 252-53 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1990). 
 76. Cox, 732 So. 2d at 1098 n.2 (quoting Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 801 
n.4 (Utah 1985)).  
 77. See, e.g., N. Am. Van Lines, Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 678 So. 2d 1325, 1330-31 
(Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (“[A] good faith obligation is implied in all insurance contracts.”) (cit-
ing DeCespedes v. Prudence Mut. Cas. Co., 193 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)). 
 78. See, e.g., Christmas v. V.I. Water & Power Auth., 527 F. Supp. 843, 845 n.1 (D.C. 
V.I. 1981) (“[P]rinciples of contract and tort are merging into a single doctrine of civil liabil-
ity.”) (citing GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 89-90 (1974)); see also James M. 
Mock, Tort Law—New Mexico Adopts Proportional Indemnity and Clouds the Distinction 
Between Contract and Tort: Amrep Southwest, Inc. v. Shollenbarger Wood Treating, Inc., 
26 N.M. L. REV. 603, 613-14 (1996) (discussing developments in New Mexico signifying 
“the reabsorption of contract principles into tort”); Michael Sean Quinn, The Defending Li-
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Allstate,79 for example, the court addressed damages for lost opportu-
nities in contract. It refused to limit such losses to aleatory (hazard-
ous) contracts citing the general trend toward absorption of contract 
within “the expanding theory of tort.”80 Notably, the Miller court 
cited bad faith as illustrating this trend,81 though it hedged its lan-
guage by characterizing certain “[t]raditional breach of contract 
cases” as “bad-faith or tortious breaches.”82 The court can hardly be 
faulted given the lack of firm guidance by other Florida courts. 
 For example, Butchikas v. Travelers Indemnity Co.83 is widely re-
garded as a benchmark in bad faith jurisprudence;84 yet the Butchi-
kas court refused to employ the term “bad faith”85 and unquestiona-
bly deemed the case before it one in contract.86 Likewise, as recently 
as 1996, the Fourth District Court of Appeal claimed in North Ameri-
can Van Lines, Inc. v. Lexington Insurance Co. that “bad faith is sim-
ply a subcategory of breach of contract.”87 Were there any doubt con-
cerning the court’s commitment to this viewpoint, it is resolved by 
the subsequent, unequivocal statement: “In Florida, a bad faith claim 
is an action ex contractu.”88 Despite other holdings to this effect,89 
some reason exists to disagree. 
                                                                                                                    
ability Insurer’s Duty to Settle: A Meditation Upon Some First Principles, 35 TORT & INS. 
L.J. 929, 951-52 (2000) (questioning the actual acceptance of “contorts” and discussing the 
phenomenon generally). 
 79. 573 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). 
 80. Id. at 30 (citing GILMORE, supra note 78); see also Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 
482 U.S. 656, 680 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“It may 
well be that ‘it is the fate of contract to be swallowed up by tort (or for both of them to be 
swallowed up in a generalized theory of civil obligation)’”) (quoting GILMORE, supra note 
78, at 94). 
 81. See 573 So. 2d at 30 n.10 (“Traditional breach of contract cases, particularly those 
between parties in a special relationship such as employer/employee or insurer/insured, 
are frequently brought as bad-faith or tortious breaches . . . departing from the limited 
remedies historically available in contract.”). 
 82. Id. Obviously, a bad faith or tortious breach is not “traditional” or there would be 
no need for the qualifying concepts of “bad faith” or “tortious” breach. 
 83. 343 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 1976). 
 84. The Butchikas decision has been cited nearly fifty times and is cited as support for 
the standard jury instruction covering bad faith failure to settle within policy limits. See 
FLA. STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTION MI 3.1. 
 85. The case discusses the insurer’s “fiduciary responsibility to its insured” with the 
parenthetical qualifier “no matter how labeled.” Butchikas, 343 So. 2d at 818. 
 86. See id. at 819 n.9 (stating that its holding did not affect the availability of none-
comonic or punitive damages “in a non-contract lawsuit,” thus obviously labeling the case 
before it a contract action). The Butchikas decision is criticized infra Part III.F. 
 87. 678 So. 2d 1325, 1327 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). 
 88. Id. at 1330. 
 89. See, e.g., Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Grounds, 332 So. 2d 13, 14 (Fla. 1976) (ex-
punging as inconsistent with Florida law the district court’s statements that “[w]hile this 
[bad faith action] is an action growing out of a contract, it is not a contract action strictly 
speaking. It is a hybrid which has some of the aspects of a tort action and some aspects of 
an action ex contractu . . . . [A]n excess judgment action, though bearing certain aspects of 
a suit upon a contract is, strictly speaking, not one . . . .”); Swamy v. Caduceus Self-Ins. 
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 There is no question that bad faith arises in connection with the 
contract at issue. This fact undergirds the holding in North American 
Van Lines that bad faith is an action ex contractu.90 Yet not every le-
gal wrong arising from a breach of contract sounds in contract law.91 
For instance, Florida has long-recognized the notion of tortious 
breach.92 In Greene v. Well Care HMO, Inc.,93 the Fourth District re-
versed a trial court in order to permit amendment of the plaintiffs’ 
complaint to include a claim of tortious breach against their HMO.94 
Perhaps more explicit was the discussion in Opperman v. Nationwide 
Mutual Fire Insurance Co.95 There, the Fifth District Court of Appeal 
relied heavily upon California’s Gruenberg96 decision and stated 
clearly that the Covenant “is independent of any contractual obliga-
tion” and “has been described as a ‘tortious breach of contract.’”97 Re-
iterating this notion, the Opperman court also emphasized that “[t]he 
function of the bad faith claim is to provide the insured with an ex-
tra-contractual remedy.”98 
 This claim is consonant with numerous references throughout 
Florida cases to the “tort” of bad faith. In Laforet,99 for instance, the 
Florida Supreme Court outlined the history of bad faith in Florida 
and referred to “the tort of bad faith” that “occurred between an in-
                                                                                                                    
Fund, Inc., 648 So. 2d 758, 760 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (limiting available damages because, 
“[i]n Florida, when an insured brings an action against his carrier for failure to settle a 
third party’s claim, the action sounds in contract”). 
 90. See 678 So. 2d at 1330 (“‘[T]he cause of action for . . . bad faith . . . is bottomed on 
the contract’ . . . . Thus, when bad faith in negotiating a settlement is alleged, the cause is 
one for breach of a contractual obligation implied in law, namely good faith.”) (quoting Na-
tionwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. McNulty, 229 So. 2d 585, 586 (Fla. 1969)); see also Am. Fid. Fire 
Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 177 So. 2d 679, 682-83 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965) (treating a breach that was 
“tantamount to bad faith” as a claim in contract). 
 91. Banfield v. Addington, 140 So. 893, 896 (Fla. 1932) (“The omission to perform a 
mere contract duty may not be a tort; but if a legal duty arises independently of or concur-
rently with the contract, a breach of the legal duty may be a tort . . . for the infraction of a 
duty implied by law . . . .”). 
 92. See, e.g., Braidi Trading Co. v. Anthony R. Abraham Enters., Inc., 469 So. 2d 955, 
956-57 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (recognizing viability of various claims including tortious 
breach of contract); Evans v. Fla. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 384 So. 2d 959, 961-62 (Fla. 
1st DCA 1980) (noting that questions of fact whether insurer “act[ed] reasonably with its 
insured” precluded summary judgment on claim for punitive damages arising from tortious 
breach of contract); Coral Gables First Nat’l Bank v. Constructors of Fla., Inc., 119 So. 2d 
741, 748 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960) (noting in dicta that tortious breach comported with the rules 
of “torts generally”). 
 93. 778 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). 
 94. See id. at 1041-42. 
 95. 515 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987). 
 96. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973). 
 97. Opperman, 515 So. 2d at 267. Likewise, the Gruenberg court stated clearly that 
the Covenant was imposed by law and that “[b]reach of this duty [the Covenant] is a tort.” 
Gruenberg, 510 P.2d at 1037. 
 98. Opperman, 515 So. 2d at 267. 
 99. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Laforet, 658 So. 2d 55, 58 (Fla. 1995). 
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surer and its insured . . . .”100 Similarly, the dissent in Kelly v. Wil-
liams101 described the plaintiff ’s  breach of good faith count as “an ex-
tension in tort for a bad faith breach of the contractual duties in-
volved.”102 Again, in Shupack v. Allstate Insurance Co.,103 the appel-
late court took note of the plaintiff ’s  “tort claim for bad faith failure 
to pay.”104 A tort theory of bad faith recovery would be in keeping 
with numerous other jurisdictions as well.105  
 Thus, while the decision in North American Van Lines observed 
correctly that bad faith arises from a breach of contract, that fact 
alone does not resolve the question. The only cited basis for this de-
termination was the statement in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. 
v. McNulty that bad faith “is bottomed on the contract [and there-
fore] the nature of an action thereon is ex contractu rather than in 
tort.”106 Yet we have seen that tort actions may arise from breach of 
contract and yield extracontractual damages. Moreover, the McNulty 
analysis occurred more than thirty years ago and was necessarily 
limited to the bad faith jurisprudence that existed at the time. That 
interpretation simply is not in keeping with modern notions of bad 
faith liability.107 
D.   Bad Faith Breach of the Covenant as Tort 
 Despite the admitted lack of clarity on the nature of bad faith 
generally, there is no question that a bad faith action premised upon 
breach of the Covenant would sound in tort. This follows from the 
fact that “[a]n action in contract differs from an action in tort in that 
the former is based on the breach of a duty imposed by agreement 
while a tort action is based on the breach of a duty imposed by 
law.”108 The Covenant, though it arises by virtue of a contractual re-
lationship, is a duty implied by law.109 Therefore, breach of this legal 
                                                                                                                    
 100. Id.  
 101. 411 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). 
 102. Id. at 905 (Cowart, J., dissenting). 
 103. 367 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). 
 104. Id. at 1103. The court did not take issue with this characterization of the claim, 
though it affirmed summary judgment because “under the facts of [the] case, appellant had 
no cause of action for punitive damages against appellee for its alleged bad faith refusal to 
pay.” Id. at 1104. 
 105. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 20, at 26 (noting that as of writing in 1992, at 
least twenty-four courts of last resort “ha[d] held that an insurer may be liable to an in-
sured for consequential or punitive damages under a tort theory, most often referred to as 
the tort of bad faith”). 
 106. N. Am. Van Lines, Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 678 So. 2d 1325, 1330 (Fla. 4th DCA 
1996) (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. McNulty, 229 So. 2d 585, 586 (Fla. 1969)). 
 107. See Henderson, supra note 20; see also supra text accompanying note 105. 
 108. Miller v. Allstate Ins. Co., 573 So. 2d 24, 27 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (citing Banfield v. 
Addington, 140 So. 893 (Fla. 1932)). 
 109. See Cox v. CSX Intermodal, Inc., 732 So. 2d 1092, 1097 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (“It is 
axiomatic that ‘[e]very contract includes not only its written provisions, but also the terms 
1406  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:1389 
 
duty, though arising incident to the contract, gives rise to a tort 
cause of action in Florida.110 
 Technically speaking, then, the matter is a simple syllogism: the 
breach of a legal duty constitutes a tort; the Covenant imposes a le-
gal duty; therefore, breach of the Covenant constitutes a tort. But 
courts in other jurisdictions have balked at the notion of opening up 
tort damages to breach of the Covenant in the context of commercial 
contracts. Apparently based on the notion that breach of the Cove-
nant might prove more economically reasonable in the commercial 
context, California has limited tort recovery for breach of the Cove-
nant to insurance contracts because an insurer’s breach of its implied 
duties directly implicates public concerns.111  
 Another, perhaps clearer and more genuine approach would be to 
delineate between breach of the Covenant, admittedly a tort by the 
rationale laid out above, and “bad faith” breach of the Covenant, also 
a tort but one that carries greater damage potential. In other words, 
there are three tiers of conduct in refusing to defend: (1) a good faith 
or negligent breach of the duty to defend that does not constitute 
breach of the Covenant and sounds only in contract;112 (2) a breach of 
the duty to defend not in good faith that accordingly gives rise to a 
tort claim for breach of the Covenant but that does not necessarily 
                                                                                                                    
and matters which, though not actually expressed, are implied by law, and these are as 
binding as the terms which are actually written or spoken.’”) (alteration in original) (quot-
ing First Nationwide Bank v. Fla. Software Servs., Inc., 770 F. Supp. 1537, 1542 (M.D. Fla. 
1991)); see also Kransco v. Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 2 P.3d 1, 8 (Cal. 2000) 
(“‘[C]ourts have held that [an insurer’s] breach of the implied covenant will provide the ba-
sis for an action in tort.’”) (alteration in original) (quoting Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 
765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988)); Baxter v. Royal Indem. Co., 285 So. 2d 652, 660 (Fla. 1st DCA 
1973) (Spector, J., dissenting) (noting the “universally recognized rule that in every insur-
ance policy there is implied by law a covenant of good faith and fair dealing”). 
 110. The fact that a breach of the Covenant sounds in tort would not preclude an ac-
companying breach of contract action. The breach of contract claim might be preferable in 
certain situations, for example, where coverage for the claim is a consideration. See, e.g., 
Fla. Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Giordano, 485 So. 2d 453, 457 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (recognizing that 
bad faith claim cannot lie against FIGA). 
 111. See, e.g., HENRY D. MILLER, 1 CAL. REAL ESTATE § 1:63 (3d ed. 2000) (“The tort of 
bad-faith breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is limited to circum-
stances in which there is a ‘special relationship.’ This required relationship is limited to in-
surance . . . .”); see also Best Place, Inc. v. Penn Am. Ins. Co., 920 P.2d 334, 341-44 (Haw. 
1996) (holding that breach of the Covenant would constitute a tort cause of action in the 
insurance context based upon policy concerns). 
 112. A similar approach was noted in Gordon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 285 N.E.2d 
849, 855-56 (N.Y. 1972) (applying the Covenant but finding that “[w]here there is a breach 
of the terms of a contract of insurance, not found to have been made in bad faith, the dam-
age for refusal to settle is limited, both in New York and elsewhere, by the policy coverage 
or, additionally, to that and the cost of defense where there is also a refusal to defend”); see 
also Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good 
Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369, 376 n.35 (1980) (“[T]he common law cases generally do not 
suggest that a negligent or inadvertent action is a breach of contract by failing to perform 
in good faith.”). 
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rise to the level of “bad faith” (this I label a “mere” breach of the 
Covenant);113 and (3) an egregious breach of the Covenant that gives 
rise to a tort claim and will likely garner extreme tort damages 
(which I label a “bad faith” breach of the Covenant).114 The first 
breach is of no moment, because it does not involve a breach of the 
Covenant and thus could never give rise to bad faith liability.115 
 Within the two remaining categories there exists nothing more 
than a fictional, semantic divide between “contractual” breach of the 
Covenant and the “tort” of bad faith. Any breach of the Covenant is 
tortious, except that what I have dubbed a “mere” breach of the 
Covenant is a tort that will garner little if any damages not already 
available in contract, while a “bad faith” breach of the Covenant 
would realize the same damages that any common law bad faith ac-
tion might. Stated differently, both a “mere” breach of the Covenant 
and a “bad faith” breach of the Covenant are technically tortious; but 
only a bad faith breach would in the course of things incur liability 
for extracontractual damages because the behavior distinguishing 
bad faith breach from mere breach is the very thing that would war-
rant more severe damages.116 Thus, a Pareto-efficient117 breach of the 
Covenant in the sterile commercial context would hardly call for an 
award of mental anguish damages. Yet the abandonment of an in-
sured to years of litigation with exposure to a substantial excess 
judgment would indeed call for at least consideration of such 
                                                                                                                    
 113. This is in keeping with the general notion that a breach of the covenant of good 
faith is not necessarily the same as “bad faith.” See, e.g., Burton, supra note 112, at 372 
n.17 (“Good faith performance also should not be equated with ‘good faith’ . . . as a fiduci-
ary duty, because the doctrine obviously could not mean that every contract requires 
‘something stricter than the morals of the marketplace.’”) (quoting Meinhard v. Salmon, 
164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928)). 
 114. It is critical to distinguish here between a breach that is “not in good faith” and a 
“bad faith” breach. While the Covenant implies “good faith,” its breach is not necessarily an 
act of “bad faith” as that term is generally meant in the insurance litigation context. 
 115. Beneath this, of course, is a refusal to defend that is entirely proper. 
 116. There might, for example, be a wrongful refusal to defend that tortiously breaches 
the Covenant; but if no coverage exists on the underlying third-party claim, no duty to set-
tle that claim would attach. Hence, no meaningful tort damages could arise from the re-
fusal to defend. See Steil v. Fla. Physicians’ Ins. Reciprocal, 448 So. 2d 589, 592 (Fla. 2d 
DCA 1984) (party must prove claim was within coverage to prevail on claim for wrongful 
refusal to defend); Keller Indus., Inc. v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 429 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 
3d DCA 1983). 
 117. An example of a Pareto-efficient breach would be one in which Party A (seller) 
breaches with Party B (buyer) in order to sell his product to Party C at such an enhanced 
profit that Party A might pay Party B’s expectation damages in contract and still make a 
profit (benefitting Party A and Party C while leaving Party B, theoretically, no worse off). 
See Mark Pettit, Jr., Private Advantage and Public Power: Reexamining the Expectation 
and Reliance Interests in Contract Damages, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 417, 432 (1987). Despite the 
overly clinical nature of law and economics generally, the Pareto-efficient breach between 
purely commercial actors provides a generic example where the Covenant might techni-
cally afford tort damages that, in reality, would rarely be sought and even more rarely 
awarded. 
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losses.118 Both breaches are technically tortious, but only one garners 
traditional bad faith damages.119 Likewise, a “mere” breach of the 
Covenant sounding in tort might theoretically expose the breaching 
party to punitive damages; but if punitive damages were warranted, 
the breach would by definition prove a case of bad faith.120 This is no 
different, ultimately, than any bad faith case as presently contem-
plated. A plaintiff under the current rubric is free to plead bad faith 
for a mere breach of contract; but proving bad faith is another matter 
altogether.  
 This is, in a sense, the manner in which Florida has treated bad 
faith all along. Like all things, bad faith is more a continuum than a 
compartmentalization. The distinction between bad faith as a con-
tract cause of action and bad faith as a tort cause of action may be 
unclear for the simple reason that it is of little practical importance. 
Bad faith behavior ultimately warrants greater damages whether 
brought under a theory of strict contract,121 tortious breach, bad faith 
in contract, bad faith in tort, or breach of the Covenant. Under my 
analysis, any breach of the Covenant gives rise to tort damages and 
potential bad faith liability; but as a practical matter, the court may 
decide no breach of the Covenant has occurred,122 or the trier of fact 
may find that the breach was not in bad faith.123 
 The three tiers of breach in the duty-to-defend context accordingly 
collapse into two. An insurer may breach its duty to defend in good 
faith giving rise to contract damages alone, or it may culpably breach 
its duty to defend and thus breach the Covenant. The breach of the 
Covenant is tortious in every instance, though the severity of mis-
conduct may render it either a “mere” breach or a “bad faith” breach. 
These are in fact just semantic descriptions of the severity of miscon-
                                                                                                                    
 118. Noneconomic damages are addressed infra Part III.F.3. 
 119. Given that even a “mere” breach of the Covenant sounds in tort, even the com-
mercial actor would be free to plead mental anguish. But recovery for mental anguish in a 
strict commercial setting between business entities is so implausible that even were it rou-
tinely pled, it would rarely if ever have any meaningful effect on the course or resolution of 
a given claim. 
 120. Whether a breach rises to the level of bad faith is a question of fact determined by 
looking to the totality of the circumstances. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Laforet, 
658 So. 2d 55, 62 (Fla. 1995) (rejecting the “fairly debatable” standard and adopting a “to-
tality-of-the-circumstances approach” in first- and third-party bad faith claims). 
 121. See, e.g., Thomas v. W. World Ins. Co., 343 So. 2d 1298, 1304 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) 
(permitting recovery of excess judgment and attorney’s fees as foreseeable contract dam-
ages arising from refusal to defend). 
 122. As a contract obligation implied by law, the court may determine on summary 
judgment whether a breach of the Covenant has occurred as long as the facts are so crys-
tallized that “the determination of the issues of a lawsuit depends upon the construction of 
[the] written instrument and the legal effect to be drawn therefrom.” Cox v. CSX Intermo-
dal, Inc., 732 So. 2d 1092, 1096 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). Naturally, the issue of good faith per-
formance will often prove subtle and factually intense. 
 123. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
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duct itself that must necessarily be determined by the trier of fact 
with a damage exposure corresponding to the insurer’s culpability. 
 Practically speaking, the approach I have suggested might be seen 
as bootstrapping the Covenant to existing bad faith jurisprudence in 
order to recognize a sorely needed cause of action for bad faith re-
fusal to defend. Seen from the opposite end, however, it merely rec-
ognizes that Florida has for some time (though without admitting it) 
viewed bad faith as a tortious breach of the Covenant. That is to say, 
the “fiduciary” duties attaching to an insurer’s assumption of the in-
sured’s defense has since Shaw been nothing more than a demand 
that the insurer honor its obligations under the Covenant; the preex-
isting case law did not, however, speak clearly in terms of the Cove-
nant and, for reasons we have seen, hinged liability upon assumption 
of the defense. While this has yielded hostility to common law first-
party claims and has sown confusion with regard to refusal-to-defend 
cases, it is in essence what has prompted the development of bad 
faith law from the start. Perhaps, then, the simplest solution is for 
Florida to do just as California and Colorado have done and recognize 
that all bad faith claims are at root an egregious breach of the Cove-
nant.124 
 It ultimately matters not in the refusal-to-defend context which is 
the point of this Article. The fact remains that there exists in Florida 
a third-party common law bad faith cause of action that has not com-
fortably incorporated refusal-to-defend. Alongside that body of law 
exists a viable Covenant jurisprudence that requires an insurer’s 
utmost fidelity when deciding whether to defend its insured. If the 
two are brought together, they form the basis for a very clear cause of 
action in tort: bad faith refusal to defend. 
III.   RECONCILING REFUSAL TO DEFEND WITH BAD FAITH 
A.   The Duty to Defend Generally 
 We saw at the beginning of this Article that bad faith was born at 
least in part as a response to the rise of liability insurance policies.125 
While an indemnification agreement merely reimbursed the insured 
for sums expended with respect to third-party claims, the liability 
policy placed the sole right and responsibility of defense with the in-
surer. The proliferation of liability policies has, in turn, affected the 
                                                                                                                    
 124. It would be foolhardy to suggest that elements of contract and tort will not con-
tinue to overlap regardless of the approach taken to bad faith liability. Issues arise about 
which choices must be made including those of limitations periods, assignability of claims, 
available defenses, and the like. Suffice it to say that these issues would be no less and no 
more difficult under a pure theory of bad faith premised upon tortious breach of the Cove-
nant than they are under the present, relatively confused, state of bad faith law in Florida. 
 125. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
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manner in which insurance is promoted to the public and, hence, the 
expectations that insureds bring to an insurance agreement.126 
 Because the typical individual lacks familiarity with the intrica-
cies of tort or property law, liability and casualty insurers advertise 
their services as a source of security and protection during times of 
need.127 Relatively unsophisticated consumers thus rely upon liability 
policies not only as a means of indemnification but as “litigation in-
surance.”128 That is, the duty to defend proves not only a valuable but 
an integral part of the purchased bargain. One Arizona appellate 
court has stated that “[a] purchaser of liability insurance has a right 
to expect not only indemnification at the end but also a shield 
against liability claims at the outset.”129 The North Dakota Supreme 
Court likewise noted that “the defense and vindication of an insured 
by his insurance carrier against third-party claims is one of the chief 
benefits of the insurance contract.”130 The point can hardly be dis-
puted given the nearly universal commercial insurance themes of se-
curity, protection, and peace of mind.131 This is all to say what seems 
quite obvious in the end: prospective insureds are fully aware when 
purchasing coverage that the insurer will be obliged to defend them 
in the event of a third-party claim and the duty to defend is second in 
value only to the duty of indemnification. 
 What might prove less obvious is that insurers themselves benefit 
from defense provisions in a number of ways. The right to defend 
lawsuits gives the insurer virtually total control over the course of 
litigation. The insurer dictates how much money will be spent on liti-
gation, what tactical choices will be made, and whether and when the 
case will be tried or settled. The insurer may even strategize on a re-
gional or national level to maintain consistency and control over 
similar actions. It may choose to appeal a given ruling depending 
upon whether it is willing to risk an adverse precedent or whether a 
given jurisdiction is the most likely to find favor with the insurer’s 
position. While the power to render such decisions is perfectly appro-
                                                                                                                    
 126. Note that the Covenant is “designed to protect the contracting parties’ reasonable 
expectations.” Cox, 732 So. 2d at 1097 (citing Scheck v. Burger King Corp., 798 F. Supp. 
692, 693 n.5 (S.D. Fla. 1992)). 
 127. See, e.g., Karen O. Bowdre, “Litigation Insurance”: Consequences of an Insurance 
Company’s Wrongful Refusal to Defend, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 743, 745-46 (1996) (discussing 
this phenomenon and citing specific examples). 
 128. Id. at 745. 
 129. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Paynter, 593 P.2d 948, 950 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979) 
(quoting Orleans Vill. v. Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 335 A.2d 315, 318 (Vt. 1975)). 
 130. Smith v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 294 N.W.2d 751, 759 (N.D. 1980). 
 131. Similarly, insurers choose connotative names such as “Prudential” and “Safeco” 
while employing metaphorically evocative logos such as Prudential’s “rock,” Allstate’s 
“good hands,” or the Travelers’ “red umbrella.” It may seem trite to point this out, but one 
must consider their importance in light of the resources insurers invest in conceiving and 
promoting such matters. 
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priate, there exists in each choice a potential conflict of interest be-
tween insurer and insured, as evidenced by the numerous bad faith 
lawsuits filed across the country each year.132 Naturally, this conflict 
also inheres in the decision whether to defend an insured at the out-
set. Ultimately, the duty to defend is not merely of contractual bene-
fit to the insured who is paying a premium for it. It is also of tremen-
dous value to the insurer who may or may not choose to assume its 
contractual duties based upon the very considerations noted above. 
 For these reasons and others, the duty to defend is distinct from 
and far broader than the duty to indemnify.133 In Florida, the duty to 
indemnify may be based upon the underlying facts of the third-party 
claim,134 but the duty to defend is determined solely by reference to 
the allegations of the third-party complaint.135 This means that a li-
ability insurer may be required to defend a lawsuit even if no cover-
age exists for the claims brought against its insured.136 It is difficult 
to overstate the breadth of an insurer’s duty to defend where there is 
any potential coverage for a claim. Florida’s First District Court of 
Appeal has summarized the governing law: 
An insurer’s duty to defend is to be determined from the allega-
tions in the complaint against the insured. The insurer must de-
fend if the allegations in the complaint could bring the insured 
                                                                                                                    
 132. A crude but somewhat illustrative Westlaw search for <“BAD FAITH” /7 INSUR! 
& DA(AFT 12/31/2000)> run in the ALLCASES database on December 20, 2001, generated 
561 hits. Expanding the search to <“BAD FAITH” /12 INSUR! & DA(AFT 12/31/1999)> 
generated 90 more hits for a total of 651. 
 133. See, e.g., Cont’l Cas. Co. v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 637 So. 2d 270, 271 (Fla. 5th DCA 
1994) (“‘[T]he agreement to defend is not only completely independent of and severable 
from the indemnity provision of the policy, but is completely different. Indemnity contem-
plates merely the payment of money. The agreement to defend contemplates the rendering 
of services.’”) (quoting Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Md. Cas. Co., 372 So. 2d 960, 963 (Fla. 3d DCA 
1979)). 
 134. See Hagen v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 675 So. 2d 963, 965 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (“Re-
gardless of the allegations of the complaint, it is the underlying facts that determine the 
duty to indemnify.”) (emphasis omitted); see also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. CTC Dev. 
Corp., 720 So. 2d 1072, 1077 n.3 (Fla. 1998) (“The duty to indemnify is determined by the 
underlying facts of the case.”). 
 135. See Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Lenox Liquors, Inc., 358 So. 2d 533, 536 (Fla. 
1977) (“The allegations of the complaint govern the duty of the insurer to defend.”) (foot-
note omitted); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Higgins, 788 So. 2d 992, 995 (Fla. 4th DCA 
2001) (“It is clear that a liability insurer’s obligation to defend a claim made against its in-
sured must be determined solely from the allegations in the complaint.”); Scheer v. State 
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 708 So. 2d 312, 313 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (“The trial court correctly 
looked to the allegations in the complaint to determine whether State Farm had a duty to 
defend.”). 
 136. See MCO Envtl., Inc. v. Agric. Excess & Surplus Ins. Co., 689 So. 2d 1114, 1115 
(Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (“The law is clear that the duty to defend is broader than the duty to 
provide coverage and the insurer is required to defend even if the facts later show that 
there is no coverage.”); Baron Oil Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 470 So. 2d 810, 814 
(Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (“[T]he duty to defend continues even though it is ultimately deter-
mined that the alleged cause of action is groundless and no liability is found within the pol-
icy provisions defining coverage.”). 
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within the policy provisions of coverage. If the complaint alleges 
facts partially within and partially outside the coverage of the pol-
icy, the insurer is obligated to defend the entire suit. The duty to 
defend is separate and apart from the duty to indemnify and the 
insurer is required to defend the suit even if the true facts later 
show there is no coverage. All doubts as to whether a duty to de-
fend exists in a particular case must be resolved against the in-
surer and in favor of the insured. So long as the complaint alleges 
facts that create potential coverage under the policy, the insurer 
must defend the suit. If it later becomes apparent (such as in an 
amended complaint) that claims not originally within the scope of 
the pleadings are being made, which are now within coverage, the 
insurer upon notification would become obligated to defend.137 
 This makes clear the extent of an insurer’s duty to defend its in-
sured against claims by third parties. It may be applied by way of 
example to the suit in Thomas v. Western World Insurance Co.,138 dis-
cussed at the beginning of this Article. In Thomas, the laundromat 
employee Kenny allegedly threw acid on the eventual plaintiff Mi-
chael Hancock.139 While Kenny’s act might be characterized as an in-
tentional tort such as battery, Hancock brought suit in negligence.140 
The insurer refused to defend on grounds that it did not cover claims 
“’arising out of assault and battery.’”141 Although the underlying acts 
may have constituted an “assault and battery,” the complaint alleged 
negligence so that ultimately even Western World conceded the 
wrongfulness of its refusal to defend the claim.142 This was true even 
though Kenny’s act might well have exceeded the scope of his em-
ployment, warranting dismissal of Hancock’s claim.143 Thus, where 
the allegedly tortious act by an insured arguably fell outside of cov-
erage and may have avoided the allegations of the complaint, the 
duty to defend applied with full force nevertheless. 
 The facts in Thomas elucidate at least one reason for demanding a 
broad duty to defend. The suit ultimately resulted in an excess judg-
ment against the insureds,144 while a competent defense by the in-
surer would have likely shielded both it and its insured from liability 
                                                                                                                    
 137. Grissom v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 610 So. 2d 1299, 1306-07 (Fla. 1st DCA 
1992) (citations omitted). 
 138. 343 So. 2d 1298 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). 
 139. See id. at 1300. 
 140. Id. Though the opinion does not discuss the specific grounds of the suit, one can 
imagine a claim against the owners of the laundromat for negligent retention and hiring, 
negligent supervision, or something along those lines. 
 141. Id. (quoting a letter written by the company’s vice president of claims). 
 142. See id. at 1300-01. 
 143. See id. at 1302-03 (“The potential defense in this case was that the insured’s agent 
Kenny committed an act outside the scope of his employment. This defense may well have 
been sufficient to relieve the insureds from liability . . . .”). 
 144. See id. at 1300 (noting an eventual judgment that more than tripled the applica-
ble policy limits). 
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altogether.145 This highlights the importance of an actual defense as 
distinguished from the mere indemnification of an insured. The con-
curring judge in Thomas believed that a liability policy is one of in-
demnification “which incidentally also includes an undertaking to de-
fend (so that the carrier may, rightfully, protect its own interest).”146 
But the duty to defend is separate and distinct from the duty to in-
demnify and an insurer that merely acts to protect its own interests 
may be held liable for having done so. The duty to defend constitutes 
more than a mere capital outlay by the insurer with an incidental 
benefit to the insured.147 Rather, it is an integral part of the bargain 
contracted and paid for by an insured that incidentally but substan-
tially benefits the insurer. 
 For present purposes, it suffices to recognize that an insurer’s 
failure to defend is naturally suspect by virtue of its broad duty to do 
otherwise. Although Florida courts have historically deemed assump-
tion of defense as the starting point in a bad faith analysis, the duty 
to defend is, after all, the broadest duty a liability insurer bears. It is 
odd, then, that an insurer may act in bad faith by observing its own 
interests in connection with indemnification while doing so with re-
spect to the broader duty to defend has never expressly been held 
bad faith.148 The insurer’s knowledge of its nearly inescapable duty to 
defend coupled with a breach of the Covenant in determining 
whether to assume an insured’s defense should, in theory, prove bad 
faith more readily than virtually any other scenario. Yet, as we shall 
see, Florida courts have generally either misunderstood or ignored 
this connection. 
                                                                                                                    
 145. It may seem counterintuitive at first blush that an insurer should be required to 
defend a lawsuit absent a duty to indemnify for any resulting judgment. But the duty to 
defend is distinct from the duty to indemnify. The insured has contracted and paid for pro-
tection from lawsuits arising in connection with the acts or items insured. The fact that a 
given lawsuit might ultimately prove beyond the relevant coverage is of no consequence to 
the very real time, expense, and inconvenience of the suit itself, frivolous or otherwise, 
brought in that connection. Conversely, were an insurer allowed to duck its duty to defend 
based upon its own investigation of the facts underlying a given claim, then the defense 
could be delayed and might often be denied over specious factual disputes. 
 146. Thomas, 343 So. 2d at 1304 (McNulty, J., concurring). 
 147. See, e.g., BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE 
COVERAGE DISPUTES § 5.03[a] (9th ed. 1998) (“The majority view is that an insurer cannot 
discharge its defense obligations by tendering its policy limits unless the policy expressly 
authorizes tender.”). Ostrager and Newman cite to Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Sulli-
van, 597 N.E.2d 62 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992), in which the court addressed a policy provision 
ending the duty to defend upon exhaustion of policy limits. The Sullivan court stated: 
“Uniformly, courts construing such policies have ruled that an insurer’s tender of the pol-
icy limits does not end its duty to defend a claim against its policyholder unless payment is 
made after a judgment or settlement.” Id. at 66. This comports with Florida’s general rule 
that bad faith turns upon an insurer having acted in its own interests rather than those of 
its insured. See, e.g, State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Laforet, 658 So. 2d 55, 58 (Fla. 
1995). 
 148. But see Am. Fidelity Fire Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 177 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965). 
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B.   Refusal to Defend: Bad Faith or No Faith? 
 We may now revisit the case of Thomas v. Western World Insur-
ance Co.149 against this backdrop. Recall that the defendants in the 
case owned the laundromat where the incident occurred. They were 
sued in negligence based upon their employee’s alleged battery on 
the plaintiff.150 Western World insured the defendants’ premises 
against liability claims, but refused to honor its defense obligations 
under the policy. The plaintiff obtained a judgment against the in-
sureds far exceeding the limits of liability coverage under their policy 
with Western World.151 
 The insureds then sued Western World for the full amount of the 
judgment based upon Western World’s refusal to defend.152 Western 
World tendered its policy limits to the insureds and moved for sum-
mary judgment claiming that the excess could not be recovered 
unless the insureds proved that Western World had acted in bad 
faith.153 The trial court granted summary judgment relying “primar-
ily on the absence of [a] showing of ‘bad faith.”154 
 Western World almost certainly raised the specter of bad faith re-
fusal to defend because it felt that its acts had not risen to the level 
of bad faith.155 In an ironic twist, the Third District Court of Appeal 
held Western World liable for the excess judgment by rejecting the 
concept of bad faith refusal to defend.156 Thus, Western World ulti-
mately proved liable for the excess judgment as a matter of contract 
law, but insurers at large would be absolved from any future bad 
faith exposure for refusal to defend under the Thomas rule.157 
 The Thomas court noted in dicta that the extent of Western 
World’s misconduct would prove a “triable issue of ‘bad faith” if bad 
faith was indeed the issue, but it ultimately concluded that refusal to 
defend simply does not implicate bad faith considerations.158 Its path 
                                                                                                                    
 149. 343 So. 2d 1298. 
 150. Id. at 1300. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. See id. at 1301. 
 154. Id. at 1303. 
 155. One might speculate that Western World wished to raise the bad faith argument 
only to then argue that it could not be achieved as a matter of law. But the trial court’s 
disposition of the case quoted above indicates that it accepted bad faith refusal to defend as 
a legal notion while holding that the plaintiff/insureds had not made the requisite factual 
“showing.” 
 156. Thomas, 343 So. 2d at 1304.  
 157. This becomes important because bad faith has developed into a pure tort, or at 
least tort-like, cause of action affording potential damages beyond those available in con-
tract. 
 158. Thomas, 343 So. 2d at 1303. The court referred to but rejected the logic of Ameri-
can Fidelity Fire Insurance Co. v. Johnson, 177 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965), which held 
an insurer liable for an excess judgment based upon refusal to defend that was deemed 
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to this conclusion is by now a familiar one. The court cited Shaw as 
the quintessential bad faith case “decided within the context of an in-
sure[r]’s failure to exercise good faith in the defense or settlement of 
claims against an insured.”159 Implicit in this scheme is “the exercise 
of judgment by the insurer.”160 But a refusal-to-defend case, according 
to the court, involved no such exercise of judgment and thus could 
not implicate bad faith. According to the Thomas court: “In the case 
before us, there is no threshold question of ‘good faith’ vs. ‘bad faith.’ 
For here, the company exercised no faith at all.”161 
 In a roundabout fashion, the Thomas court engaged in the typical 
Florida bad faith analysis that deems assumption of an insured’s de-
fense a predicate to the duty of good faith. The analysis goes some-
thing like this: if an insurer’s duty of good faith arises from its “fidu-
ciary” role as the sole decisionmaker with respect to litigation, then it 
follows that it cannot be liable for bad faith where it has not become 
the sole decisionmaker with respect to litigation. Of course, it be-
comes the sole decisionmaker only upon assumption of the defense; 
hence, it cannot be liable in bad faith unless it assumes the defense. 
This has an appealing symmetry, and frankly it comports with Flor-
ida’s general approach to bad faith since Shaw. Yet this logic ignores 
the legal requirement that all discretionary decisions be undertaken 
in good faith. That is, it ignores the Covenant. The legal duty of good 
faith simply will not square with the notion of “no faith” because the 
exercise of “no faith” is merely bad faith by omission rather than 
commission. The Thomas rationale treats the refusal to defend as no 
decision at all, when in fact it is a deliberate decision to deny an in-
sured’s claim to its contractual defense, albeit by inaction.  
 Inaction is a strange creature in the law, and it can pose difficult 
problems in traditional tort claims. For example, these problems 
arise where one has the power to prevent injury or death but is un-
der no legal duty to do so and, in fact, chooses not to do so. But the 
character of inaction is altogether different where the parties have 
contractually agreed to act upon certain contingencies such as the fil-
ing of a lawsuit. Nor will it do to deem inaction a breach of contract 
that is categorically incapable of amounting to bad faith. For bad 
faith is not necessarily a single act or episode that can be pointed to 
                                                                                                                    
“tantamount to bad faith in the performance of its contractual obligations to the insured.” 
Id. at 683. 
 159. Thomas, 343 So. 2d at 1303-04 (citing Auto Mut. Indem. Co. v. Shaw, 184 So. 852 
(Fla. 1938)). 
 160. Id. at 1304. 
 161. Id. 
1416  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:1389 
 
after the fact; it is a measure of the insurer’s total culpability in 
breaching the contract. It encompasses the severity of the breach.162 
 The Thomas decision stated that “[t]he concept of bad faith . . . 
presupposes the company is attempting to exercise skill, judgment 
and fidelity on [the insured’s] behalf.”163 The court concluded that bad 
faith could not apply, therefore, since the insurer never assumed the 
insured’s defense at which point, presumably, it would in fact have to 
exercise skill, judgment, and fidelity.164 By corollary this statement 
implies that an insurer need not exercise skill, judgment, or fidelity 
at any point in the claims process or in the very decision of whether 
to honor its contractual duty to defend. At a minimum, the court’s 
logic suggests that an insurer is free to exercise something less than 
skill or fidelity until it assumes an insured’s defense, yet the Cove-
nant stands in direct opposition to any such notion. To what stan-
dard would the Thomas court hold an insurer prior to assumption of 
an insured’s defense or with respect to the actual decision whether to 
defend? If it is not one of skill, judgment, or fidelity, then I am at a 
loss to explain what it might be. 
 Moreover, the Thomas court, perhaps in an effort to broaden an 
insurer’s liability for refusal to defend in contract, sidestepped an 
important case that could easily have disposed of the action on bad 
faith grounds. The Thomas decision only briefly mentioned the First 
District Court of Appeal’s opinion in American Fidelity Fire Insur-
ance Co. v. Johnson,165 which involved similar issues. In American 
Fidelity, the court addressed a liability insurer who failed “to investi-
gate and appraise the probability and the extent of [its insured’s] li-
ability” in connection with a wrongful death claim.166 The insurer re-
fused to defend and thus never assumed Florida’s “fiduciary” duty of 
good faith accompanying control of an insured’s defense. Neverthe-
less, the American Fidelity court deemed the insurer’s failure to in-
vestigate the claim “tantamount to bad faith in the performance of its 
contractual obligations to the insured.”167 The Thomas court brushed 
American Fidelity aside by claiming that there would be a triable is-
                                                                                                                    
 162. See, e.g., Thomas v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 424 So. 2d 36, 38 (Fla. 3d DCA 
1982) (“Each [bad faith] case is to be determined on its own facts, and the question of the 
insurer’s failure to act in good faith with due regard for the interests of the insured is for 
the jury.”). 
 163. Thomas, 343 So. 2d at 1304. 
 164. Id.  
 165. 177 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965). 
 166. Id. at 683. 
 167. Id. It is interesting to note the equivocation in American Fidelity that the in-
surer’s refusal to investigate and resulting refusal to defend were “tantamount,” that is, 
“equivalent to” bad faith. This wordplay made no practical difference in the outcome of the 
case, but it stopped short nevertheless from declaring outright that refusal to defend could 
constitute bad faith as such. The American Fidelity case did not discuss the Covenant in 
reaching its conclusions but relied instead upon well-reasoned policy grounds. 
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sue in the case before it if it “were to follow the outline of American 
Fidelity,” which, as we have seen, it did not.168 Had the Thomas court 
embraced American Fidelity, it might simply have remanded for a 
trial on the issue of bad faith. Instead, it clung to Florida’s attach-
ment of fiduciary duties upon assumption of defense and found “no 
faith” rather than “bad faith.” In this sense, Thomas directly con-
flicted with American Fidelity, though the Thomas decision declined 
to say as much. 
 On one hand, the Thomas court can be commended for tackling 
the refusal-to-defend issue squarely, which few Florida courts have 
done.169 But on the other hand, its analysis isolates refusal to defend 
in the realm of contract while its logical counterpart, bad faith re-
fusal to settle, has burgeoned into its own class of civil liability. And 
although the Thomas court correctly allowed for a full recovery of the 
excess judgment as a matter of foreseeable contract damages, its 
categorization of refusal-to-defend claims into pure contract would 
deny relief that might prove available now or in the future under the 
bad faith rubric. Likewise, this categorization would alter the proce-
dural landscape within which refusal-to-defend cases might be prose-
cuted as contract rather than tort actions. 
 At least one other Florida case has addressed the issue of refusal 
to defend. Robinson v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.170 stands 
apart from other Florida cases for its extensive survey of refusal-to-
defend claims.171 While the Robinson court lamentably came to no au-
thoritative conclusion, it remanded the plaintiff ’s  bad faith refusal-
to-defend action for further proceedings.172 
                                                                                                                    
 168. Thomas, 343 So. 2d at 1303.  
 169. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 453 So. 2d 1187, 1190 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) 
(affirming summary judgment against a bad faith refusal to defend claim on the nebulous 
(and factually disputable) basis that “[i]t cannot reasonably be said that Allstate or its 
counsel was guilty of the kind of conduct which has typified those cases in which the courts 
have found the existence of bad faith”); Fla. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rice, 393 So. 2d 
552, 555 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980) (avoiding the issue by “[a]ssuming that bad faith is re-
quired for recovery over policy limits in a case such as this where there is a refusal to 
defend . . . .”); First of Ga. Ins. Co. v. Dube, 376 So. 2d 910, 911 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (sug-
gesting without discussion that an excess judgment might be awarded for refusal to defend 
where “bad faith is involved”); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 273 So. 2d 117, 
121 & n.7 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973) (permitting recovery of excess judgment in contract and 
thus expressly declining to address the trial court’s finding of bad faith for refusal to de-
fend); Am. Fidelity, 177 So. 2d at 683 (characterizing an egregious refusal to defend as 
“tantamount to bad faith” though declining to declare it so outright). 
 170. 583 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). 
 171. The American Fidelity decision included ample discussion of refusal to defend 
within the larger context of failure to investigate, but it based its ultimate holding on equi-
table policy grounds and included little in the way of doctrinal discussion, for example, of 
the Covenant. 
 172. Robinson, 583 So. 2d at 1069. 
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 The facts in Robinson were rather convoluted. In short, State 
Farm’s insured, Lockley, caused an auto accident in which Robinson 
was severely injured. State Farm denied coverage for the accident 
without adequate investigation and it refused to defend Lockley 
against Robinson’s personal injury action.173 Robinson won a jury 
verdict totaling nearly ten times the coverage under Lockley’s policy 
with State Farm.174 Robinson then filed suit for the excess judgment 
against State Farm, citing its bad faith failure to investigate, failure 
to defend, and failure to settle within the policy limits.175 State Farm 
won summary judgment in the trial court in part because the trial 
judge ruled that the denial of the plaintiff ’s  motion for summary 
judgment on coverage in the underlying action meant that State 
Farm had not, as a matter of law, acted in bad faith.176 
 The appellate decision in Robinson surveyed Florida’s checkered 
history of refusal-to-defend cases. It began by recognizing the di-
lemma that has arisen when courts have considered “‘bad faith’ [as] 
essentially a breach of implied fiduciary duties that arise out of the 
insurer’s right to control the defense and settle claims against the in-
sured.”177 The opinion then mentioned American Fidelity, which it 
characterized broadly as a case involving the failure to examine cov-
erage or investigate properly.178 Robinson briefly addressed other 
cases scattered about Florida’s bad faith landscape and then pro-
posed a set of factors that might tend to prove bad faith, presumably 
encompassing refusal to defend.179 These factors include whether the 
insurer could have obtained a reservation of rights, whether it took 
efforts to limit potential prejudice to its insured, the weight of legal 
authority supporting its coverage dispute, the diligence of its investi-
gation, and any settlement efforts it may have made.180 The Robinson 
court ultimately reversed the summary judgment and remanded the 
case for further proceedings.181 
 The important point to take from Robinson is that a court may 
find that an insurer acted in bad faith even where it never assumed 
                                                                                                                    
 173. Id. at 1064-65. 
 174. Id. at 1065. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 1067. 
 178. See id. at 1068. It is surprising that Robinson did not address American Fidelity 
at greater length because American Fidelity is arguably the only Florida case at the time to 
have permitted a bad faith action despite refusal to defend. 
 179. The Robinson opinion never returned directly to the refusal-to-defend issue but 
instead subsumed refusal to defend within the broader considerations relevant to proof of 
bad faith, thus incorporating refusal to defend within bad faith by default. 
 180. Robinson, 583 So. 2d at 1068. 
 181. See id. at 1069. 
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the defense of its insured.182 Thus, Robinson began its discussion by 
noting Florida’s history of predicating bad faith upon the assumption 
of an insured’s defense but ultimately concluded that the question 
may be determined by examining the circumstances surrounding the 
insurer’s denial of coverage. The Florida Supreme Court expressly 
approved this approach in Laforet.183  
 Like so many other refusal-to-defend cases, Robinson is important 
for what it did not say. It did not deem refusal to defend a bar to bad 
faith. It did not expressly conflict with Thomas insofar as it read 
Thomas to mean only that one need not prove bad faith to recover an 
excess judgment for refusal to defend (while it, Robinson, would also 
allow a bad faith recovery where refusal to defend was involved).184 
Moreover, Robinson did not mention the doctrine that might unify all 
of these considerations: the Covenant. 
C.   Near Misses in Bad Faith Refusal to Defend: A Summary 
 A number of decisions have thus applied Florida law and permit-
ted a claim in the nature of bad faith for refusal to defend. In 
American Fidelity,185 the First District Court of Appeal ruled on pol-
icy grounds that an insurer who refused to defend should not be in a 
better position than one who assumed defense of the insured and 
thereafter acted in bad faith. The court accordingly permitted recov-
ery of an excess judgment for inadequately investigating the claim 
and failing to explore settlement possibilities, behavior it deemed 
“tantamount to bad faith in the performance of its contractual obliga-
tions to the insured.”186 It affirmed the trial court’s summary judg-
ment in favor of the insured. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
reached a similar conclusion in predicting Florida law in Seward v. 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.187 There, the insured 
sustained an excess judgment arising from State Farm’s refusal to 
                                                                                                                    
 182. To appreciate this point, one must distinguish between refusal to defend as a posi-
tive cause of action and refusal to defend as a bar to bad faith liability. Under Shaw and its 
progeny, the duty of good faith arises upon assumption of an insured’s defense so that re-
fusal to defend may be seen as a barrier to bad faith liability rather than simply as a bad 
faith cause of action. 
 183. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Laforet, 658 So. 2d 55, 62-63 (Fla. 1995) (dis-
cussing the factors set forth in Robinson and expressly adopting them as applicable to 
first- and third-party bad faith claims). 
 184. See Robinson, 583 So. 2d at 1068. Robinson does, in fact, conflict with Thomas to 
some degree while sidestepping the issue much in the same way Thomas sidestepped 
American Fidelity. The Thomas court declared refusal to defend an act of “no faith” while 
Robinson avoided that question by characterizing the acts culminating in the refusal to de-
fend as potentially giving rise to bad faith. Of course, the Florida Supreme Court’s express 
approval of Robinson in Laforet, 658 So. 2d at 63, resolves any such dispute in favor of Rob-
inson. 
 185. 177 So. 2d 679, 683 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965). 
 186. Id. 
 187. 392 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1968). 
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defend him in a wrongful death action and subsequently brought suit 
under Florida law. State Farm was removed on diversity grounds.188 
The court addressed whether State Farm could be held liable for an 
excess judgment against its insured, whom it refused to defend, 
where the plaintiff in the underlying action never made an offer of 
settlement.189 Though the Seward court did not formally address the 
viability of an action for bad faith refusal to defend, the court (and 
apparently the parties) accepted the cause of action as a given.190 Fi-
nally, the Robinson case discussed above reversed a summary judg-
ment in favor of an insurer, thus permitting a bad faith refusal-to-
defend case to proceed.191 
 All three of these cases recognized Florida’s rule predicating bad 
faith on the insurer’s failure to perform duties that arise only upon 
assumption of an insured’s defense.192 Each approved, to some de-
gree, of bad faith refusal-to-defend theories, but none squarely ad-
dressed the incompatibility of bad faith refusal to defend with the 
prevailing assumption-of-defense-as-threshold view.193 This is no 
mere technicality. Under Shaw, and virtually every bad faith deci-
sion in Florida’s history, control of the claim has been seen as the cir-
cumstance giving rise to a duty of good faith.194 Though American Fi-
delity, Seward, and Robinson arguably reached proper conclusions by 
recognizing a claim for bad faith refusal to defend, all danced around 
                                                                                                                    
 188. Id. at 725. 
 189. Id. at 724. 
 190. See id. at 728 (“[T]he insurer is not liable for bad faith or conduct tantamount to 
bad faith in the absence of an offer to settle.”); cf. Hendry v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co., 372 
F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1967) (affirming trial court’s refusal to permit a bad faith refusal-
to-defend cause of action where “[t]he record disclosed no evidence of ‘bad faith’, and the 
question of a settlement was not involved in the instant case”). 
 191. Other cases have obliquely suggested the propriety of a bad faith refusal-to-defend 
cause of action. See Fla. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rice, 393 So. 2d 552, 555 (Fla. 1st 
DCA 1980) (“Assuming that bad faith is required for recovery over policy limits . . . where 
there [has been] a refusal to defend . . . .”); First of Ga. Ins. Co. v. Dube, 376 So. 2d 910, 
911 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (reversing judgment against insurer and limiting recovery to policy 
limits where no bad faith was involved). 
 192.  Seward, 392 F.2d at 726 (“[A]n insurer who undertakes to defend but in bad faith 
refuses to settle a claim within the policy limits thereby subjects itself to liability for any 
excess over the policy limits that may be recovered.”); Robinson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. 
Co., 583 So. 2d 1063, 1067 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (“[W]hen the insured has surrendered to 
the insurer all control over the handling of the claim, including all decisions with regard to 
litigation and settlement, then the insurer must assume a duty to exercise such control and 
make such decisions in good faith . . . .”) (quoting Boston Old Colony Ins. v. Gutierrez, 386 
So. 2d 783, 785 (Fla. 1980)); Am. Fid. Fire Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 177 So. 2d 679, 681 (Fla. 1st 
DCA 1965) (“[A] liability insurance carrier which undertakes to defend and in bad faith re-
fused to settle a claim within policy limits will thereby subject itself to liability for any ex-
cess which may be recovered.”). 
 193. The Robinson opinion effectively incorporated refusal to defend within the total-
ity-of-the-circumstances approach, but it failed to expressly resolve the critical tension be-
tween refusal to defend and assumption of defense as a trigger for the duty of good faith. 
 194. See cases cited supra notes 32-33. 
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the defining element of bad faith in Florida jurisprudence. Most no-
tably, none of these cases discussed the Covenant, though it readily 
resolves this incompatibility. 
D.   Justifying the Move to Bad Faith Refusal to Defend Predicated  
on Breach of the Covenant 
 By now, it should be abundantly clear that refusal to defend can-
not be squared with existing Florida law, at least not by any refer-
ence to existing bad faith principles. Tying Florida’s Covenant juris-
prudence into its bad faith jurisprudence resolves this tension. The 
Covenant arises at the time of contracting, or certainly no later than 
claim notification, and it imposes on the insurer a duty to make all 
discretionary decisions in good faith.195 Its breach, then, could give 
rise to the tort of bad faith refusal to defend without regard to 
whether a “fiduciary” duty attaches upon assumption of the insured’s 
defense. Naturally, the breach of fiduciary duties postdefense may 
give rise to “traditional” bad faith as has been the case since Shaw. 
Alternatively, even “traditional,” postdefense bad faith could be seen 
as a breach of the Covenant in a situation where an insurer bears a 
heavy burden of good faith because of its power to control litigation 
and settlement. In other words, all breaches of the Covenant, with 
respect to defense or settlement, expose the insurer to potential bad 
faith liability depending upon the circumstances surrounding the 
particular breach. Seen this way, the traditional “fiduciary” duties 
attendant the assumption of an insured’s defense are no different 
than the ever-present duties imposed by the Covenant, while the in-
surer’s power to control litigation and settlement is but one circum-
stance tending to prove bad faith. Similarly, the breadth of an in-
surer’s legal duty to defend its insured is a circumstance favoring a 
finding of bad faith for refusal to defend, which is merely a 
predefense breach of the Covenant. Approaching bad faith in this 
manner harmonizes pre- and postdefense bad faith jurisprudence 
while imposing upon insurers a single, definable duty to act in good 
faith from the inception of every claim. Indeed, the benefits of this 
approach go well beyond a desire to simplify and harmonize Florida’s 
approach to all bad faith breaches. 
 First, a theory of bad faith refusal to defend predicated on breach 
of the Covenant will squarely address (and hopefully resolve) the 
question of whether bad faith arises in contract or in tort. Under the 
Covenant model, there would exist the three tiers of liable conduct: 
(1) good faith or negligent breach of the duty to defend that does not 
constitute breach of the Covenant and sounds only in contract; (2) a 
                                                                                                                    
 195. See discussion of the Covenant supra Part II.B. 
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breach of the duty to defend (not made in good faith) that accordingly 
gives rise to a tort claim for breach of the Covenant but which does 
not necessarily rise to the level of “bad faith” (a “mere” breach of the 
Covenant); and (3) an egregious breach of the Covenant that gives 
rise to a tort claim and will likely garner extreme tort damages (a 
“bad faith” breach of the Covenant).196 Resolving this confusing issue 
might overcome Florida’s reluctance or inability to describe the most 
fundamental aspects of bad faith, particularly refusal to defend that 
might amount to bad faith. Of course, a more coherent approach 
would yield a more predictable and normatively beneficial doctrine. 
 The most obvious and important normative benefit concerns the 
behavior of insurers with respect to their defense obligations. This 
requires no academic discussion; simply imagine that you have been 
sued by a third party for damages that may or may not ultimately 
exceed your policy limits. What incentives would you prefer govern 
your insurer’s response to your demand for a contractual defense 
against the claim? Under the first option, your insurer’s wrongful re-
fusal to defend, if actually litigated at some future date, will result at 
most in an obligation to pay the liability policy limits, the amount of 
an excess judgment, if any, and (arguably) your attorney’s fees. Un-
der a second option, your insurer could face unpredictable and poten-
tially staggering tort damages should it fail to honor its duty to de-
fend. Which option might you personally choose? The answer is obvi-
ous and clearly illustrates the normative benefits of a well-defined 
and broadened tort remedy for refusal to defend.  
 In turn, it is difficult to imagine the insurer’s response to this 
logic. One might expect the argument that a broadening of tort 
remedies will result in more jury verdicts and increased costs that, 
predictably, would be passed on to the insured public. This claim 
rings hollow in the bad faith context, however. An insurer’s alleged 
breach, even if limited to contract remedies, will generate litigation. 
The only distinction is that a contract rather than a tort claim will be 
litigated. While tort claims admittedly expose a defendant to greater 
damages (which is, of course, the point), it is difficult to accept any 
suggestion by the insurance industry that it must pass on to its in-
sureds the costs associated with its bad faith misconduct. Our juris-
prudence should not ignore the normative benefits of broadened tort 
remedies in hopes of minimizing the costs that the tortfeasor itself 
might seek to pass along to those it has harmed. 
 A refusal-to-defend jurisprudence limited to foreseeable contract 
damages necessarily creates a situation in which the insurer can 
foresee, and therefore balance, the costs of defense against the costs 
of refusing to defend (discounted by the probability of subsequent 
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litigation by the insured and any savings the insurer realizes at the 
outset by avoiding the expense of defending its insured). Under such 
a construction, the insurer determines whether it will be exposed to a 
bad faith claim, and the exposure may be limited by breaching the 
contract. If the insurer breaches, it may file a declaratory action, 
thus subjecting its insured to a two-front war between the third-
party case and the declaratory judgment action, both of which re-
quire out-of-pocket representation by virtue of the very breach at is-
sue.197 An insurer may well anticipate its ability to exhaust or coerce 
its insured under such circumstances. It thus has a range of incen-
tives to roll the dice and refuse to defend its insured.198 Rolling the 
proverbial dice is, after all, the very nature of the insurance business. 
 Moreover, a breach by the insurer upon the filing of a third-party 
claim differs from the traditional commercial contract. In the text-
book commercial setting, the breaching party may have received 
payment for goods that it chose not to deliver in accordance with the 
parties’ contract, but the benefits of such a breach would be easily 
disgorged. In the insurance context, however, an insured has neces-
sarily performed his or her end of the bargain by dutifully paying 
premiums, often for years. Upon being sued by a third party, the in-
sured looks to its insurer for the rendering of an esoteric duty at a 
peculiarly precarious time for the insured. An insurer could not con-
ceivably satisfy its duty to the insured with delivery of a check for le-
gal services because the duty to defend transcends the mere capital 
outlay in hiring a lawyer and litigating a civil action.199 The Califor-
nia Supreme Court succinctly stated this policy rationale: “The 
availability of tort remedies in the limited context of an insurer’s 
breach of the covenant [of good faith] advances the social policy of 
                                                                                                                    
 197. Florida courts encourage declaratory actions under such circumstances. See, e.g., 
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Higgins, 788 So. 2d 992, 1004 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Allstate 
Ins. Co. v. Conde, 595 So. 2d 1005, 1006-07 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). There are sound reasons 
for permitting this procedure, and even plaintiff ’ s  attorneys may benefit from its efficient 
and early determination of potential bad faith claims. But it is no less onerous to insureds 
and no less ripe for exploitation by an insurer who wishes to engage its insured in a war of 
attrition. The ideal solution might be for an insurer to defend under a reservation of rights. 
 198. Other jurisdictions have recognized this phenomenon. See, e.g., Smith v. Am. 
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 294 N.W.2d 751, 759 (N.D. 1980) (recognizing that absent bad faith 
liability for refusal to defend insurance companies might “exert whatever coercion in what-
ever manner and under whatever circumstances as would serve their financial interest 
[leaving the insured] without a remedy for damages for the failure to defend beyond attor-
ney’s fees and legal costs”); Farris v. U.S. Fid. Guar. Co., 587 P.2d 1015, 1028 (Or. 1978) 
(noting that absent bad faith refusal to defend, “a liability insurer intending to breach its 
contract in bad faith is encouraged to do so at the outset rather than risk the tort liability 
applicable to bad faith breaches in performance”) (Lent, J., dissenting); Warren v. Farmers 
Ins. Co., 838 P.2d 620, 623-24 (Or. Ct. App. 1992) (“[I]t is difficult to see why the insurer 
should be in a better position by refusing to defend and thereby breaching the insurance 
contract than it would have been had it undertaken the defense but done so negligently.”). 
 199. Virtually all jurisdictions agree that an insurer may not satisfy its duty to defend 
merely by paying the policy benefit. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
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safeguarding an insured in an inferior bargaining position who con-
tracts for calamity protection, not commercial advantage.”200 
 This approach also honors the contract as bargained for by insur-
eds, respecting their purchase of “litigation insurance,”201 and is in 
keeping with the nearly inescapable duty to defend that applies to 
indemnity contracts in Florida.202 The culpability of an insurer’s be-
havior dictates the available remedies. A good faith breach of con-
tract remains limited to contract remedies. A “mere” breach of the 
Covenant gives rise to potential tort damages. And a “bad faith” 
breach exposes the insurer to damages certainly unrecoverable as 
foreseeable contract damages.203 These considerations reveal the ul-
timate commendation for bad faith liability predicated on the Cove-
nant: its fairness. How might an attorney explain to Joe that his in-
surer acted in bad faith by dropping his defense midsuit while ex-
plaining to Jane that her insurer did not act in bad faith when it 
never assumed her defense in the first place? Though an explanation 
might be given, a justification would prove far more difficult. 
E.   The Nature of Bad Faith Refusal to Defend Predicated  
on Breach of the Covenant 
1.   Conduct Constituting Bad Faith 
 If we accept the necessity of a model predicating bad faith refusal 
to defend on breach of the Covenant, the next step is to define what 
sort of bad faith we will have recognized. Under current bad faith ju-
risprudence, the trier of fact must determine whether a given breach 
of the contract rises to the level of bad faith.204 A claim that an in-
surer wrongfully refused to defend its insured does not differ signifi-
cantly in character from a claim for wrongful refusal to settle. Ac-
cordingly, the question of whether an insurer has breached the 
Covenant or whether that breach amounts to bad faith would “ordi-
narily [pose] a question for the trier of fact to be determined after 
considering the totality of the circumstances.”205 The core question 
would be whether the insurance company failed to honor its contrac-
tual duty to defend “when, under all of the circumstances, it could 
                                                                                                                    
 200. Kransco v. Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 2 P.3d 1, 8 (Cal. 2000) (citation 
omitted). 
 201. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Damages are discussed infra Part III.F. 
 204. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Davis, 412 F.2d 475, 481 (5th Cir. 1969) (“The ques-
tion of failure to act with due regard for the interests of the insured is for the jury.”) (citing 
Campbell v. Gov’t Employees Ins. Co., 306 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 1974)). 
 205. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Laforet, 658 So. 2d 55, 62-63 (Fla. 1995) (reject-
ing the “fairly debatable” standard and adopting a “totality-of-the-circumstances” approach 
in first- and third-party bad faith claims). 
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and should have done so, had it acted fairly and honestly toward its 
insured and with due regard for his interests.”206 According to the 
Florida Supreme Court decision in Laforet, the jury should take at 
least five factors into account:  
(1) whether the insurer was able to obtain a reservation of the 
right to deny coverage . . . (2) efforts or measures taken by the in-
surer to resolve the coverage dispute promptly or in such a way as 
to limit any potential prejudice to the insureds; (3) the substance 
of the coverage dispute or the weight of legal authority on the cov-
erage issue; (4) the insurer’s diligence and thoroughness in inves-
tigating the facts specifically pertinent to coverage; and (5) efforts 
made by the insurer to settle the liability claim in the face of the 
coverage dispute.207 
These factors are tailored to the refusal-to-settle context, but they 
provide a structure to determine whether an insurer acted with due 
regard for its insured’s interests in refusing to defend against a 
third-party liability claim. Additionally, the fact that the duty to de-
fend is so broad should enter into the calculus of whether the insurer 
breached that duty in bad faith. 
2.   Refusal to Defend: First- or Third-Party Claim? 
 If one accepts the proposition that bad faith refusal to defend may 
and should be predicated upon breach of the Covenant, one must also 
attempt to characterize whether a resulting claim is in the nature of 
first- or third-party bad faith. I have suggested that a broad accep-
tance of bad faith predicated on breach of the Covenant would abol-
ish most distinctions between first- and third-party bad faith.208 This 
is so because exposure to excess damages would no longer serve as 
the litmus for bad-faith liability; instead, the severity of an insurer’s 
misconduct would determine whether it acted in bad faith. Naturally, 
an insured’s exposure to an excess judgment, for example, would 
prove more harmful if he or she has to pay that judgment, so that 
what is now deemed third-party bad faith might remain more egre-
gious in certain ways than what is now deemed first-party bad faith. 
But these would become differences in character rather than kind. 
Unless Florida embraces breach of the Covenant in such a broad 
manner, and there is no indication that it might, the distinction be-
                                                                                                                    
 206. FLA. STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTION MI 3.1; see also Gen. Star Indem. Co. v. An-
heuser-Busch Cos., 741 So. 2d 1259, 1261 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (“The standard for evaluat-
ing bad faith claims against insurers for first party as well as third party claims under the 
common law as well as under the [unfair claim settlement] statute is whether the insurer 
acted fairly and honestly toward its insured with due regard for the insured’s interests.”). 
 207. Laforet, 658 So. 2d at 63 (approving of Robinson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 
583 So. 2d 1063, 1068 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)). 
 208. See discussion supra notes 31-43. 
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tween first- and third-party claims will remain important. Of par-
ticular note is that first-party claims exist only by statute,209 and 
failure to abide the statutory presuit procedures will destroy a cause 
of action for first-party bad faith.210 It is necessary, then, to address 
at least briefly the nature of refusal to defend within the first- or 
third-party claim context. 
 The duty to defend under a liability policy runs between an in-
surer and its insured. Thus, the breach of this duty appears to give 
rise to a first-party claim. Supporting this notion, at least facially, is 
the fact that the first-party insured in a refusal-to-defend claim is as-
serting the breach of a duty owed directly to him or her under the 
contract. Moreover, an adversarial relationship exists between in-
surer and insured in the refusal-to-defend context.211 And unlike the 
duty of indemnification, the duty to defend does not directly benefit 
an injured third party.212 
 But therein lies the distinction: in a true first-party claim there is 
no third party who might benefit or not by the insurer’s acts. In first-
party bad faith claims “the insured is the injured party and claimant, 
and no injured third party is involved . . . .”213 This comports with the 
commonsense notion that an insurer would never have a contractual 
duty to defend against a first-party claim—for example, an unin-
sured motorist or property claim—because there is no one from 
whom the insured requires protection. Instead, the first-party in-
                                                                                                                    
 209. See Laforet, 658 So. 2d at 58-59 (“[N]o first-party action by an insured for bad 
faith [existed] in Florida at common law . . . . Essentially, Florida courts [have] refused to 
recognize the tort of first-party bad faith . . . .”). 
 210. FLA. STAT. § 624.155(2)(a) (2000). 
 211. See Baxter v. Royal Indem. Co., 285 So. 2d 652, 656 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973) (noting 
that in a first-party claim “the parties occupy a contractually adversary position toward 
each other”). 
 212. See Laforet, 658 So. 2d at 58 (“Florida courts [have] allowed the injured third 
party to bring a bad faith action directly against the first party’s insurer . . . because the 
injured third-party, as the beneficiary to the bad faith claim, was the real party in interest 
in a position similar to that of a ‘judgment creditor.’”) (citing Thompson v. Commercial Un-
ion Ins. Co., 250 So. 2d 259, 264 (Fla. 1971)). 
 213. Dunn v. Nat’l Sec. Fire & Cas. Co., 631 So. 2d 1103, 1107 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993); see 
also Time Ins. Co. v. Burger, 712 So. 2d 389, 391 (Fla. 1998) (characterizing third-party 
claims as those “in which an insured sues his liability insurance company for bad faith in 
failing to settle a claim which ultimately results in a third-party judgment against him in 
excess of the policy limits”); Laforet, 658 So. 2d at 59 (“Unlike third-party bad faith actions, 
in first-party bad faith actions the insured, particularly in uninsured motorist claims, is 
also the injured party who is to receive the benefits under the policy.”) (citing McLeod v. 
Cont’l Ins. Co., 591 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 1992)); Greene v. Well Care HMO, Inc., 778 So. 2d 
1037, 1042 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (“The distinction between the first party claims and third 
party claims was based upon obligations between the insured and insurer. In the duty to 
defend and settle, the insurer is acting on the insured’s behalf and for his or her benefit.”). 
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surer directly indemnifies the insured for losses the insured has suf-
fered.214 
 Insofar as an adversarial relationship might distinguish first- 
from third-party claims,215 it should be remembered that a traditional 
first-party claim is inherently adversarial. That is, the claim ines-
capably turns on a resolution of contractually adverse interests be-
tween a claimant and the insurer from whom redress is sought. In 
the refusal-to-defend context, however, the insurer and insured share 
theoretically aligned interests,216 at least until the insurer breaches 
its duty to defend. If the relatively curtailed statutory remedy for 
first-party bad faith is characterized by an adversarial relationship 
between insurer and insured, then the insurer has an incentive to 
breach the contract, thereby creating an adversarial relationship, in 
order to limit its insured to statutory remedies. Indeed, the bad faith 
statute arguably affords no remedy at all for an insurer’s bad faith 
breach of an insurer’s duty to defend.217 To the extent it does, the 
remedy is certainly more limited than that available in common law 
bad faith.218 It would be puzzling at best if an insurer were permitted 
to avoid or diminish common law bad faith liability by breaching its 
contractual duties in bad faith, thus creating an adversarial relation-
                                                                                                                    
 214. See, e.g., OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 147, at 654 (“First-party insurance re-
imburses the insured for losses which he incurs as a result of injury to himself or damage 
to property which he owns or leases.”). 
 215. See supra note 211. 
 216. This is itself a bit of fiction as attested to by the number of bad faith cases liti-
gated each year, but this is precisely the distinction relied upon by the Baxter court and 
others in distinguishing first-party from third-party claims. 
 217. Section 624.155, Florida Statutes, does not expressly identify refusal to defend as 
a basis for statutory bad faith liability. One might arguably bootstrap a refusal-to-defend 
claim under section 624.155(1)(b)(1), which permits a bad faith claim for an insurer’s fail-
ure to settle. But failure to settle is not the precise misconduct at issue in a refusal-to-
defend case. Theoretically, there would be no need for a refusal-to-defend claim were there 
a failure to settle or, more particularly, failure to settle should serve as a separate basis for 
liability rather than as a shoehorn for refusal to defend. Section 626.9541(1)(i)(3), Florida 
Statutes, permits a bad faith claim for conduct that is akin to and often present in the re-
fusal-to-defend context, but it does not expressly identify breach of an insurer’s duty to de-
fend as a basis for bad faith liability. 
 218. If section 626.9541(1)(i)(3), Florida Statutes, were interpreted to permit a bad 
faith claim for an insurer’s refusal to defend, the insured would be required not only to 
prove a violation of the statute in its case but that the insurer committed such breaches 
“with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice.” Id. See Shannon R. Ginn 
Constr. Co. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 51 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1353 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (“To prevail, the 
plaintiff must establish that the insurer committed unfair acts ‘with such frequency as to 
indicate a general business practice.’”) (quoting FLA. STAT. § 626.9541(1)(i)(3)). Likewise, 
punitive damages are not available for statutory bad faith absent proof of a general busi-
ness practice. FLA. STAT. § 624.155(4) (2000). One decision has held that four instances of 
demonstrable misconduct do not constitute a “general business practice.” See Howell-
Demarest v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 673 So. 2d 526, 529 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (not-
ing that the plaintiff must “demonstrate that [the insurer] engaged in this practice far 
more frequently than that.”). Of course, statutory claims are also subject to the notice and 
curing provisions that do not apply at common law. FLA. STAT. § 624.155(2)(b)-(f). 
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ship and circumscribing its insured’s remedies by the very acts al-
leged to constitute bad faith. 
 Finally, a number of Florida decisions obliquely or implicitly ac-
cepted the notion of bad faith refusal to defend prior to the passage of 
section 624.155, Florida Statutes.219 First-party bad faith did not ex-
ist prior to passage of the statute.220 It follows a fortiori that any bad 
faith refusal to defend recognized (or not dismissed as a first-party 
claim) prior to passage of the statute tends to define refusal to defend 
as a third-party claim. 
 In short, there is little to characterize refusal to defend as a first-
party claim. On the other hand, the duty arises solely in connection 
with a third-party claim. It involves an adversarial relationship only 
to the extent that the insurer has breached its duties and thus acted 
in bad faith. In addition, cases prior to passage of the bad faith act 
suggest the viability of bad faith refusal to defend. Insofar as the dis-
tinction between first- and third-party claims remains important un-
der the model I have suggested, refusal to defend should be treated 
as a third-party bad faith claim. 
3.   Discovery in the Bad Faith Refusal-to-Defend Claim 
 Another issue of collateral interest is the nature of discovery in a 
refusal-to-defend bad faith action. To what extent should an insured 
or the insured’s judgment creditor be permitted to discover the in-
surer’s claim files relating to the underlying third-party claim and 
litigation? In the typical third-party bad faith scenario, the insured 
or judgment creditor is permitted to discover everything in the in-
surer’s claim file up to the date of the underlying judgment.221 The 
rationale, however, is that the insurer owed a fiduciary duty to its in-
sured and was acting in its insured’s interests in processing and liti-
gating the underlying claim so that work-product immunity does not 
apply to the insurer’s files.222 This rule does not attach in first-party 
bad faith actions where the insurer and insured are in an adversarial 
posture from the inception of the claim.223  
 The better argument with respect to bad faith refusal to defend 
predicated on breach of the Covenant would be to permit discovery of 
                                                                                                                    
 219. See cases cited supra Part III.C. 
 220. See supra note 209. 
 221. Dunn v. Nat’l Sec. Fire & Cas. Co., 631 So. 2d 1103, 1109 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) 
(“Discovery of the insurer’s claim file . . . is allowed.”); Stone v. Travelers Ins. Co., 326 So. 
2d 241, 243 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976) (stating that the “company’s file . . . should be produced”). 
 222. Dunn, 631 So. 2d at 1109 (permitting discovery over work product objections); 
Stone, 326 So. 2d at 243 (“In defending personal injury litigation, an insurance company 
participates not only on behalf of itself, but also on behalf of its insured.”). 
 223. See Manhattan Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Kujawa, 522 So. 2d 1078, 1080 (Fla. 4th DCA 
1988), aff’d, 541 So. 2d 1168, 1169 (Fla. 1989) (precluding discovery). 
2002]                          BAD FAITH OR NO FAITH? 1429 
 
the insurer’s files, at least until the time that coverage and defense 
were denied. To begin with, the insurer and insured are not in an ad-
versarial relationship from the inception of the claim in a refusal-to-
defend scenario, as is the case in the first-party claim. In fact, they 
are in precisely the same circumstances as every third-party claim-
ant and insurer, at least until the insurer decides not to defend the 
insured. Until that time, the insurer is presumably acting in the best 
interests of its insured so that the logic and policy permitting discov-
ery in third-party bad faith actions apply with full force in the re-
fusal-to-defend context. To the extent the insurer’s otherwise 
nondiscoverable materials demonstrate that the insurer was not act-
ing in its insured’s best interests, when by law it should have been 
doing so, it would make little sense to immunize the insurer’s files 
from discovery in a subsequent bad faith action. Such a policy would 
reward the insurer’s bad faith breach of its duty to defend by conceal-
ing the very proof of its misconduct. In other words, an insurer acting 
with due regard to its insured’s interests during the initial claim 
process would eventually have to reveal its files under Florida’s tra-
ditional approach to bad faith discovery. The insurer who fails to act 
with due regard to its insured’s interests surely cannot argue that 
this distinction affords it immunity from discovery of the same mate-
rials. 
 Any materials generated by the insurer after its denial of the in-
sured’s defense might prove relevant to demonstrate the reasons the 
insurer refused to defend. Yet their discoverability is questionable 
and would necessarily depend upon the nature of the privilege or 
immunity asserted. Work-product immunity, for instance, might ap-
ply because subsequent litigation against the insurer is foreseeable 
even where the insurer rightfully declines to defend its insured.224 
Then again, it is hard to imagine any other source for claim docu-
ments so that if the insured can demonstrate a need for postdenial 
materials, the work-product immunity might be overcome.225 More-
over, a policy denying subsequent bad faith discovery for materials 
generated after denial of the claim might encourage early breaches. 
This would effectively reward the most culpable breaches by render-
ing them the most difficult to prove. Naturally, work-product immu-
nity and applicable discovery privileges can be addressed on a case-
by-case basis with such considerations in mind. 
                                                                                                                    
 224. See, e.g., Fed. Express Corp. v. Cantway, 778 So. 2d 1052, 1053 (Fla. 4th DCA 
2001) (“Materials prepared in anticipation of litigation are not subject to discovery except 
on a showing that the party seeking discovery ‘has need of the materials in the preparation 
of the case and is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of 
the materials by other means.’”) (quoting FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.280(b)(3)). 
 225. See id.; see also Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Totaltape, Inc., 135 F.R.D. 199, 202 (M.D. 
Fla. 1990) (holding work-product protection of claims files waived where claims manager 
relied upon them to refresh recollection during deposition). 
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 An additional consideration applies where the insured has won a 
declaration of the duty to defend prior to bringing its bad faith ac-
tion. In such circumstances, Florida courts have directly held that an 
insurer’s claim files are discoverable from the inception of the third-
party claim.226 
 Absent peculiar circumstances tending to prove that an adversar-
ial relationship existed from the very inception of the claim process, 
logic demands that we distinguish between predenial and postdenial 
discovery. Full discovery should be permitted for materials generated 
prior to a denial of coverage and defense because those circumstances 
are identical to the typical third-party claim. Materials generated af-
ter denial of coverage and defense might arguably enjoy greater pro-
tection because an adversarial relationship (created by the insurer) 
existed from that point forward. The matter is an interesting one 
that requires more attention than I can afford it in this Article. 
4.   Other Considerations 
 A host of other considerations arise once one characterizes refusal 
to defend as a potential bad faith action. Most, however, are shared 
with bad faith generally, and it is beyond the scope of this Article to 
follow every potential lead. My purpose has been to demonstrate the 
need and the legal justification for bad faith predicated on refusal to 
defend. I hope that purpose has been accomplished by this point. But 
a list of potential collateral issues is desirable to round out this the-
sis. 
 One issue certain to arise is whether an excess judgment would be 
an essential element in a refusal-to-defend bad faith claim. The Flor-
ida Supreme Court has deemed an excess judgment a predicate to 
statutory third-party bad faith liability.227 It reasoned that the bad 
faith statute creates a duty intended to protect the insured and that 
absent an excess judgment, the third-party cannot prove that the in-
surer breached its fiduciary duties.228  
                                                                                                                    
 226. Fortune Ins. Co. v. Greene, 775 So. 2d 338, 339 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (deeming 
work-product discoverable because “[w]hen coverage is established through a declaratory 
judgment action, the insurer’s fiduciary relationship with the insured dates back to the 
time the claim is made”) (citing Gen. Acc. Fire & Life Ins. Corp. v. Boudreau, 658 So. 2d 
1006 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)). These holdings conflict with Shaw’s general principle that the 
fiduciary duty arises upon assumption of an insured’s defense but are consonant with the 
duties an insurer owes its insured under the Covenant. 
 227. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Zebrowski, 706 So. 2d 275, 277 (Fla. 1997) (stating 
that “in the absence of an excess judgment,” the third-party’s claim cannot stand); see also 
Cunningham v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co., 630 So. 2d 179, 181 (Fla. 1994) (characterizing 
excess judgment as “an element of a bad faith-claim”); Kelly v. Williams, 411 So. 2d 902, 
904 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (“[A] cause of action for bad faith arises when the insured is le-
gally obligated to pay a judgment that is in excess of his policy limits.”). 
 228. Zebrowski, 706 So. 2d at 277 (“[I]n the absence of an excess judgment, a third-
party plaintiff cannot demonstrate that the insurer breached a duty toward its insured.”); 
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 Although there may well be an excess judgment following an in-
surer’s refusal to defend (as occurred in Thomas v. Western World In-
surance Co.229), it does not necessarily occur. On one hand, the ra-
tionale set out above could be applied to refusal-to-defend cases 
where there is a judgment for less than the limits of the policy that is 
ultimately satisfied by the insurer. Yet the insured whose insurer re-
fuses to settle does not suffer the expense and anguish of litigation 
that burdens the victim of a wrongful refusal to defend. Indeed, it is 
undoubtedly true in at least some cases that the insured is forced to 
judgment or settlement for the very reason that the insurer breached 
its duty to defend in bad faith. If bad faith refusal to defend is predi-
cated on the insurer’s breach of the Covenant, then the breach and 
its result are identical to an excess judgment scenario except for the 
presence of the excess judgment. In other words, the conduct that 
amounts to bad faith and theoretically should warrant bad faith 
remedies is present regardless of whether the insured faces the addi-
tional burden of an excess judgment. The excess judgment, in fact, is 
a wholly separate matter that does not itself indicate the presence of 
bad faith because an excess can occur where the insurer rightfully re-
fused to defend. In these circumstances, the insured has faced conse-
quences of the insurer’s breach that are not present in the refusal-to-
settle context, and the excess judgment serves merely as a measure 
of monetary losses rather than a predicate to bad faith liability. The 
harm to the insured does not lie only in the excess judgment. Indeed, 
the harm is done at the very inception of litigation, and its conse-
quences include all of the events leading up to the excess judgment. 
It makes little sense to demand an excess judgment as proof of bad 
faith where the harm lies in the nature and severity of the insurer’s 
breach, a matter that could in theory be demonstrated even before 
judgment in the underlying action. Without engaging in an exhaus-
tive analysis, then, the existence of an excess judgment should prove 
irrelevant to whether a cause of action exists for bad faith refusal to 
defend predicated on breach of the Covenant, though the excess 
judgment is clearly some measure of damages. 
 A tangentially related issue is whether the injured third party 
might bring a bad faith refusal-to-defend action directly against the 
insured defendant’s liability insurer. Since Thompson v. Commercial 
Union Insurance Co. of New York,230 Florida has permitted a judg-
ment creditor to bring a bad faith claim directly against the 
                                                                                                                    
see also McLeod v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 591 So. 2d 621, 624-25 (Fla. 1992) (“Third-party actions 
do not allow for the recovery of the excess judgment in cases in which the insured is not 
damaged by the excess liability.”) (citing Fid. & Cas. Co. v. Cope, 462 So. 2d 459, 461 (Fla. 
1985)). 
 229. 343 So. 2d 1298, 1300-01 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). 
 230. 250 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1971). 
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nonsettling insurer. In permitting this procedure, however, the 
Thompson court reasoned that the injured judgment creditor is a 
third-party beneficiary under the liability policy because its indemni-
fication provisions were intended to benefit injured third persons.231 
But the defense provisions in a liability policy are intended to do just 
the opposite—to guard against and potentially avoid the injured 
third party’s claim. In this sense, a judgment creditor in a refusal-to-
defend case has a weak third-party beneficiary argument except to 
the extent the refusal to defend might have resulted in a failure to 
settle and, hence, to indemnify. However, the Thompson court also 
relied on the fact that the injured third party is a “real party in in-
terest” to the contract (albeit in part because of the third party’s 
third-party beneficiary status).232 Such considerations are beyond the 
scope of this Article, but they merit consideration should Florida 
adopt a model of bad faith refusal to defend similar to that proposed 
here. 
 Of course, an exhaustive list of collateral considerations would 
correlate to the virtually endless factual scenarios that might arise in 
bad faith refusal to defend, and many are common to bad faith gen-
erally. For instance, when a bad faith refusal-to-defend cause of ac-
tion accrues and when it might be brought are complex considera-
tions common to other bad faith cases. Another massive undertaking 
would be to address the procedural complexities that arise in bad 
faith generally, with particular attention to bad faith refusal to de-
fend. These depend in large part upon whether bad faith is charac-
terized as an action in tort or in contract.233 Comparative bad faith is 
one example among many of the novel substantive and procedural 
bridges to be crossed in bad faith.234 Other defenses might be common 
to contract and tort, such as the duty to mitigate losses; yet they will 
take on a different flavor in the context of bad faith refusal to de-
fend.235 Again, these are matters beyond the scope of this Article, but 
they warrant at least passing mention. If nothing else, such matters 
                                                                                                                    
 231. Id. at 261-64. 
 232. See id. at 262. 
 233. Ironing out the wrinkles in the hybridized “ConTort” bad faith area is one poten-
tial benefit of squarely identifying bad faith as a tort cause of action. 
 234. See, e.g., Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. King, 568 So. 2d 990, 990-91 (Fla. 
4th DCA 1990) (striking defense of comparative bad faith and declining “to create a new af-
firmative defense”); see also Kransco v. Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 2 P.3d 1, 5-8 
(Cal. 2000) (analyzing and rejecting comparative bad faith under California law, which is 
quite similar to the inchoate model I have proposed). 
 235. See, e.g., U.S. Auto. Ass’n v. Hartford Ins. Co., 468 So. 2d 545, 547 (Fla. 5th DCA 
1985) (holding that an insurer may not challenge the reasonableness of an insured’s third-
party settlement following a refusal to defend). But see Steil v. Fla. Physicians Ins. Recip-
rocal, 448 So. 2d 589, 592 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (characterizing “consent judgment with a 
covenant not to execute” as “suspect” and holding that it may not be enforced against the 
insurer if “unreasonable in amount or tainted by bad faith”). 
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illustrate that the hybridization of contract and tort through bad 
faith will present interesting questions, the answers to which prove 
necessary to the long-term health of the law. To the extent that the 
questions bear upon bad faith refusal to defend, I cannot help but re-
iterate the egregious nature of this tort, the abandonment of an in-
sured at the time of greatest need—indeed, at the very moment for 
which years of insurance premiums have been paid. When this oc-
curs for mercenary reasons that breach the Covenant and run 
counter to the very purpose of purchasing insurance coverage, an in-
surer should receive the severest reproach that might be constitu-
tionally fashioned within our civil law. 
F.   The Nature of Bad Faith Refusal to Defend Predicated  
on Breach of the Covenant: Damages 
1.   Generally 
 Even if Florida were to accept a cause of action for bad faith re-
fusal to defend predicated on breach of the Covenant, the question 
remains what difference this might make with respect to remedies. 
The Thomas court recognized that the plaintiffs might recover the 
excess judgment as well as their attorney’s fees and costs as elements 
of foreseeable losses in a strict contract action.236 The Robinson court 
observed that there would seemingly be “little difference in the expo-
sure of the insurer under a bad faith or contractual theory.”237 This 
may or may not be the case. It is neither possible nor necessary to 
exhaustively analyze the potential remedial aspects of bad faith re-
fusal to defend in this Article. Whether characterizing wrongful re-
fusal to defend as bad faith might necessarily garner more damages 
is somewhat beside the point for two reasons. First, even if bad faith 
and contractual remedies might be coextensive at this point in time, 
that is not to say that this will always prove true. Bad faith is a nas-
cent and quickly evolving area of law. A refusal-to-defend claim 
sounding in bad faith might well garner damages distinct from con-
tractual remedies two or ten or twenty years in the future. That po-
tentiality will never be realized unless the true nature of the cause of 
action is recognized now.  
 Second, refusal to defend remains an anomaly under Florida’s 
current bad faith jurisprudence. Regardless of whether refusal to de-
fend might ever serve as a basis for distinct damages, it is an end 
unto itself that we harmonize the presently dissonant chords sound-
ing in our bad faith jurisprudence. The common law is tangential in 
                                                                                                                    
 236. Thomas v. W. World Ins. Co., 343 So. 2d 1298, 1303 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). 
 237. Robinson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 583 So. 2d 1063, 1069 n.23 (Fla. 5th DCA 
1991) (citing Butchikas v. Travelers Indem. Co., 343 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 1976)). 
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nature, the seemingly slightest or most insignificant anomalies may 
over the course of time yield bizarre and irreconcilable results. In-
deed, this is the precise manner in which refusal to defend has, over 
time, been relegated to the pale of bad faith jurisprudence rendering 
it a peculiar and intimidating presence. A cause of action for refusal 
to defend premised on breach of the Covenant is at odds with the 
traditional approach to Florida bad faith even while our courts could 
uneventfully incorporate it into existing bad faith jurisprudence 
without fear of substantial contradiction. Put plainly, Florida has 
embraced a myopic version of bad faith premised on failure to settle, 
and it should correct this vision for the sake of correction regardless 
of whether litigants might enjoy certain remedial advantages as a re-
sult. 
 And the argument remains that damages under bad faith refusal 
to defend could indeed differ from those available in contract. Puni-
tive and noneconomic damages are particularly obvious examples. To 
that end, a brief look at potential damages is appropriate despite 
both the limited relevance of damages and the fact that articles con-
cerning bad faith remedies could sustain an entire law review issue 
in their own right. 
2.   Punitive Damages 
 The successful common law third-party bad faith litigant today 
might expect to recover the amount of the excess judgment, attor-
ney’s fees and costs in bringing the bad faith case, loss of any prop-
erty levied upon as a result of the underlying judgment, prejudgment 
interest, and foreseeable contract damages.238 Each might be recov-
ered in a strict contract action for refusal to defend. The potential 
distinction between refusal to defend in bad faith and refusal to de-
fend in contract lies in the recovery of extracontractual damages in-
cluding punitive and noneconomic losses.239 
 Both remedies are stifled under the Florida Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Butchikas v. Travelers Indemnity Co.,240 which held that puni-
tive damages would be available only in cases involving “deliberate, 
                                                                                                                    
 238. See generally James F. McKenzie, Unfair Claims Practices & Bad Faith, in 
FLORIDA AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE LAW §§ 7.35-.37 (Fla. Bar 2000); see also Dunn v. Nat’l 
Sec. Fire & Cas. Co., 631 So. 2d 1103, 1106-08 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (explaining that direct 
consequential damages and other losses beyond the excess judgment may be recoverable in 
appropriate cases). 
 239. See, e.g., Ferguson Transp., Inc. v. N. Am. Van Lines, Inc., 687 So. 2d 821, 822 
(Fla. 1996) (“The general rule is that punitive damages are not recoverable for breach of 
contract, irrespective of the motive of defendant.”). 
 240. 343 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 1976). 
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overt and dishonest dealing”241 and that damages for mental anguish 
could not be recovered given Florida’s impact doctrine.242 One could 
quite literally devote an article to the problems inherent in the 
Butchikas court’s reasoning and treatment of the case before it. I am 
satisfied to list several. 
 First, Butchikas theoretically should not apply to the “tort of bad 
faith”243 because the Butchikas court limited its holding to cases aris-
ing in contract. Interestingly, the Robinson court believed that the 
Butchikas decision “did not expressly classify an ‘excess case’ as ei-
ther tort or contract.”244 To the contrary, in the course of limiting pu-
nitive and noneconomic damages in the “excess case” before it, the 
Butchikas court stated that its holding did not affect the availability 
of nonecomonic or punitive damages “in a non-contract lawsuit.”245 
The court clearly deemed the case before it one in contract or this ob-
servation would have been unnecessary. Elsewhere, the court distin-
guished an authority on grounds that the case “involved a tort action 
rather than a contract action.”246 These statements are cryptic when 
considered in light of the court’s apparent uncertainty about whether 
to characterize the case as one in bad faith (or perhaps its unwilling-
ness to do so),247 though they leave no question that the Butchikas 
court addressed the case before it as one in contract. It is no wonder, 
then, that punitive and noneconomic damages were limited. But this 
is hardly the extent of the errors in Butchikas. 
 The plaintiffs in Butchikas sought punitive damages under the 
authority of the earlier supreme court decision of Campbell v. Gov-
ernment Employees Insurance Co.248 The Campbell court allowed an 
award of punitive damages against the insurer because the case “in-
volved the elements of concealment and misrepresentations—a con-
                                                                                                                    
 241. Id. at 818 (“We . . . view this class of case as less egregious than those involving 
deliberate, overt and dishonest dealing. In this class of case the insured can be made whole 
by a compensatory damage award and a recovery of attorney’s fees.”). 
 242. Id. at 819 (“The rule in Florida has been that, absent a physical injury, a plaintiff 
can recover damages for mental anguish only where it is shown the defendant acted with 
such malice that punitive damages would be justified.”) (citing Crane v. Loftin, 70 So. 2d 
574 (Fla. 1954)). 
 Also worth noting is section 627.737(4), Florida Statutes (2000), which purports to abol-
ish punitive damages in this context: “In any action brought against an automobile liability 
insurer for damages in excess of its policy limits, no claim for punitive damages shall be al-
lowed.” According to McKenzie, supra note 238, at § 7.38, the constitutionality of this stat-
ute has not been addressed. 
 243. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Laforet, 658 So. 2d 55, 58 (Fla. 1995) (refer-
ring to “the tort of bad faith”). 
 244. Robinson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 583 So. 2d 1063, 1069 n.23 (Fla. 5th DCA 
1991).  
 245. Butchikas, 343 So. 2d at 819 n.9. 
 246. Id. at 817 n.2. 
 247. The Butchikas decision never uses the term “bad faith” and refers to an insurer’s 
failure to “honor” its “responsibility” to its insured “no matter how labeled.” Id. at 818. 
 248. 306 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 1974); see Butchikas, 343 So. 2d at 816. 
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tinued course of dishonest dealing on the part of insurer toward in-
sured.”249 While admittedly the insurer’s conduct in Butchikas did not 
involve overt concealment and misrepresentation, the Butchikas 
court did not merely distinguish Campbell on these grounds. Rather, 
it characterized Campbell as limiting recovery of punitive damages to 
those cases involving overt concealment and misrepresentation.250 
Courts since Butchikas have limited punitive damages in bad faith 
cases in reliance upon this illogic.251 Although the Butchikas ration-
ale was ultimately based on public policy, the method by which it 
reached its conclusion is hardly sound. Imagine that you have 
brought a claim of civil battery for having been punched in the nose. 
Imagine next that the court denies your recovery by citing an earlier 
battery case that permitted damages for a battery involving a gun, 
reasoning that only shootings merit damages in civil battery. As ab-
surd as this reasoning would be, it is directly analogous to the out-
come in Butchikas, which held that because the Campbell decision 
permitted punitive damages based upon proof of concealment and 
misrepresentation, all litigants who fail to prove concealment and 
misrepresentation are not entitled to punitive damages. Nor did the 
Butchikas decision offer any convincing public policy for its logically 
specious limitation on punitive damages. It stated: “The social policy 
for punitive damages, as articulated by Mr. Justice Ervin in Camp-
bell, is a sound one, but its application here is misplaced. A potential 
award in excess of policy limits plus attorney’s fees should be stimu-
lus enough for an insurer . . . to communicate with its insured . . . .”252 
But this claim is belied by the very facts before the Butchikas court 
in which “the company wholly ignored their insured from the begin-
ning to the end of the proceedings.”253 
 In short, Butchikas refused to discuss “bad faith” as such and 
handed down a decision governing extracontractual damages in what 
                                                                                                                    
 249. 306 So. 2d at 532. 
 250. Butchikas, 343 So. 2d at 818 (“The social policy for punitive damages, as articu-
lated by Mr. Justice Ervin in Campbell, is a sound one, but its application here is mis-
placed. A potential award in excess of policy limits plus attorney’s fees should be stimulus 
enough for an insurer . . . to communicate with its insured . . . .”). 
 251. See, e.g., Dunn v. Nat’l Sec. Fire & Cas. Co., 631 So. 2d 1103, 1108 (Fla. 5th DCA 
1993) (“In general, [to recover punitive damages], dishonesty, misrepresentations, and 
fraudulent conduct must be alleged and established.”) (citing Butchikas, 343 So. 2d 816); 
Shuster v. S. Broward Hosp. Dist. Physicians’ Prof ’ l Liab. Ins. Trust, 570 So. 2d 1362, 
1367 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (“[I]n Butchikas . . . the [s]upreme [c]ourt held that punitive 
damages and damages for mental anguish . . . were not available [in excess judgment 
cases] absent a claim of active concealment or deliberate misrepresentation which would 
amount to an independent tort.”); Indus. Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Romer, 432 So. 2d 66, 69 
(Fla. 4th DCA 1983) (stating that under Butchikas, punitive damages would be available 
“if the plaintiff/insured in a third party bad faith case proved that the company engaged in 
deliberate, overt and dishonest dealing . . . .”). 
 252. Butchikas, 343 So. 2d at 818. 
 253. Id. 
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the court obviously considered a contract case. The ostensible logic 
and policy supporting the opinion lack coherence, yet it remains a 
limiting principle in Florida bad faith law.254 Even with these limita-
tions, however, the fact remains that should Florida characterize re-
fusal to defend as a tortious breach of the Covenant, Butchikas will 
likely apply. Thus, although Butchikas represents a marginal depar-
ture from what might be expected in the way of punitive damages in 
strict contract, it is a potential departure nevertheless, and offers a 
reason to right the approach Florida has taken with respect to re-
fusal to defend. 
3.   Noneconomic Losses 
 Butchikas proves even more troublesome if viewed exclusively 
through the lens of noneconomic losses suffered by virtue of an in-
surer’s bad faith refusal to defend. The Butchikas court stated its 
conviction that “the insured can be made whole by a compensatory 
damage award and a recovery of attorney’s fees.”255 Yet, as discussed 
above, the insured whose insurer refuses to defend stands in far 
more precarious posture than the insured whose insurer refuses to 
settle. While both are abandoned by the insurer, the insured who suf-
fers a bad faith refusal to settle faces only the potential for a per-
sonal judgment in excess of the policy limits that in all likelihood will 
be negotiated in the context of a subsequent third-party bad faith ac-
tion by the judgment creditor. When an insurer refuses to defend, 
however, the insured is cut loose to drift in an ocean of tort law with-
out guidance or representation. Many insureds lack the sophistica-
tion or resources to obtain private counsel. Moreover, insurers debat-
ing their duty to defend or indemnify are encouraged to file declara-
tory judgment actions in Florida,256 thus subjecting the insured not 
only to the underlying legal action, but to litigation instigated by the 
very party the insured counted on in the eventuality at hand. 
 Also distinguishing the refusal-to-defend insured from the refusal-
to-settle insured is a point raised by the Butchikas court itself. 
Namely, the court keenly observed that any mental anguish suffered 
by an insured in the refusal-to-settle context is ultimately a result of 
the insured’s choice to purchase relatively insufficient coverage.257 
Putting aside those insureds who simply cannot afford extravagant 
                                                                                                                    
 254. See, e.g., Dunn, 631 So. 2d at 1108 (citing Butchikas as governing the proof neces-
sary to recover punitive damages in common law bad faith). 
 255. Butchikas, 343 So. 2d at 818. 
 256. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Higgins, 778 So. 2d 1002, 1003-04 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 2001); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Conde, 595 So. 2d 1005, 1006 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). 
 257. Butchikas, 343 So. 2d at 819 (“[I]n ‘excess’ cases the fact and degree of financial 
exposure are brought about by the insured’s decision to risk the financial and emotional 
consequences which naturally flow from the insufficiency of coverage.”). 
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coverages, the simple fact remains that the amount of coverage pur-
chased is irrelevant in a refusal-to-defend case. While it might ulti-
mately bear on the amount of any excess judgment entered against 
the insured, it has no bearing on the propriety of the insurer’s refusal 
to defend or the mental anguish of an insured facing a lawsuit by the 
injured party and potentially facing a second lawsuit by the very in-
surer it paid to protect it under such circumstances. 
 Finally, the Butchikas court denied recovery of mental anguish 
damages because “[t]he rule in Florida ha[d] been that, absent a 
physical injury, a plaintiff [could] recover damages for mental an-
guish only where it [was] shown the defendant acted with such mal-
ice that punitive damages would be justified.”258 The so-called “im-
pact rule” has come under assault since Butchikas, however. In fact, 
a case pending before the Florida Supreme Court at the time of this 
writing could ultimately curtail or even prove fatal to the doctrine.259 
 Of course, if Florida embraces refusal to defend as a breach of the 
Covenant sounding in tort, noneconomic losses might arguably prove 
more appropriate as a traditional tort remedy. Regardless of how this 
question might be resolved at present, noneconomic losses remain a 
potential recovery in bad faith refusal to defend that would not typi-
cally exist in contract.260 The potentiality alone serves as reason to 
place refusal to defend in its proper context so that whatever eventu-
ality arises, Florida’s bad faith framework will be poised to integrate 
it in a consistent and harmonious fashion. 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
 Florida has developed a restrictive view of bad faith. In searching 
out bad faith conduct, Florida courts first ask whether an insurer as-
sumed its insured’s defense because under Florida’s narrow view of 
bad faith, this event triggers the insurer’s fiduciary obligations, the 
breach of which might give rise to a claim in bad faith.  
                                                                                                                    
 258. Id. 
 259. See Gracey v. Eaker, 747 So. 2d 475, 477-78 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (certifying as a 
question of great public importance whether the an exception to the impact rule should ap-
ply for infliction of emotional injuries in violation of a statutory duty of confidentiality), 
rev. granted, 760 So. 2d 946 (Fla. 2000). Other bad faith cases addressing recovery of men-
tal anguish damages depend upon the impact rule and might thus be affected as well. See, 
e.g., Time Ins. Co. v. Burger, 712 So. 2d 389, 393 (Fla. 1998) (carving out limited exception 
for recovery of noneconomic losses in bad faith); Otero v. Midland Life Ins. Co., 753 So. 2d 
579, 580 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (reversing substantial jury award for emotional distress in 
bad faith claim).  
 260. Damages for mental anguish are not available even for “willful and flagrant” 
breach of contract. See Floyd v. Video Barn, Inc., 538 So. 2d 1322, 1325 (Fla. 1st DCA 
1989). Of course, this rationale applies not only to mental anguish, but loss of enjoyment of 
life, emotional distress, and any other noneconomic damages that might legitimately be 
pled in response to an insurer’s refusal to defend. 
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 This myopic view led the Third District Court of Appeal to reject 
bad faith as a prerequisite for recovery in the refusal-to-defend con-
text because, it said, the bad faith concept “presupposes [the] exer-
cise [of] skill, judgment and fidelity on [the insured’s] behalf.”261 It 
does indeed. But so, too, does the Covenant demand the exercise of 
skill, judgment, and fidelity on the insured’s behalf before a defense 
of the insured has been assumed. Indeed, skill, judgment, and fidel-
ity must inform the decision of whether to defend an insured in the 
first place. It follows that its breach should constitute bad faith 
where the attendant facts and circumstances warrant such a finding. 
Apparently unaware of this potentiality, the Thomas court deemed 
wrongful refusal to defend an act of “no faith” rather than one of “bad 
faith.” Yet an act of “no faith” under the Covenant is itself an act of 
bad faith by omission. 
 The apparent incongruity is only that: apparent. By reconciling 
Florida’s bad faith jurisprudence with its Covenant jurisprudence, 
refusal to defend may be brought into the fold without contradiction. 
I have proposed a structure in which three possibilities exist. An in-
surer may wrongfully refuse to defend in good faith; it may refuse to 
defend in breach of the Covenant and thus give rise to tort damages 
(a “mere” breach); or it may refuse to defend in such a way or on such 
grounds as to breach the Covenant and give rise to extraordinary tort 
damages (a “bad faith” breach). Under our existing common law bad 
faith structure, the particulars are for jurors to decide in light of the 
surrounding circumstances. This is as it should be. 
 Though my suggested framework is hardly the only manner in 
which refusal to defend might be reconciled with existing bad faith 
principles, I hope it is, if nothing else, a starting point for a serious 
reexamination of this illusory contradiction. I have no doubt that 
should there be a serious reexamination of our refusal-to-defend ju-
risprudence, experienced and authoritative voices on all sides of the 
debate would contribute in ways I have not considered. At a mini-
mum, I hope to have raised a flag of distress that might at least 
spark concern over where we are heading in light of where we have 
been. In the end, my goal would be achieved were there some af-
firmative response to what I hope by now is a demonstrated need. 
Unless such a response is forthcoming, the refusal-to-defend doctrine 
will persist as a forbidding mirage of apparent contradiction. Both 
the health of the law and the rights of our litigants demand other-
wise. 
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